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### Plan

#### Plan:  The United States Federal Judiciary should conduct judicial ex post review of United States’ targeted killing operations that use drones, with liability falling on the government for any constitutional violation, on the grounds that the political question doctrine should not bar justiciability of cases against the military.

### Allies

#### Advantage 1 is Allied Cooperation –

#### U.S. drone policy is more important than the spying and data scandal to European partners – it threatens the trans-atlantic relationship

Dworkin 7/17/13 (Anthony, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Actually, drones worry Europe more than spying” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/17/actually-drones-worry-europe-more-than-spying/>)

Relations between the United States and Europe hit a low point following revelations that Washington was spying on European Union buildings and harvesting foreign email messages. Behind the scenes, though, it is not data protection and surveillance that produces the most complications for the transatlantic intelligence relationship, but rather America's use of armed drones to kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield. Incidents such as the recent killing of at least 17 people in Pakistan are therefore only likely to heighten European unease. In public, European governments have displayed a curiously passive approach to American drone strikes, even as their number has escalated under Barack Obama’s presidency. Many Europeans believe that the majority of these strikes are unlawful, but their governments have maintained an uneasy silence on the issue. This is partly because of the uncomfortable fact that information provided by European intelligence services may have been used to identify some targets. It is also because of a reluctance to accuse a close ally of having violated international law. And it is partly because European countries have not worked out exactly what they think about the use of drones and how far they agree within the European Union on the question. Now, however, Europe’s muted stance on drone strikes looks likely to change. Why? For one thing, many European countries are now trying to acquire armed drones themselves, and this gives them an incentive to spell out clearer rules for their use. More importantly, perhaps, Europeans have noticed that drones are proliferating rapidly, and that countries like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are soon likely to possess them. There is a clear European interest in trying to establish some restrictive standards on drone use before it is too late. For all these reasons, many European countries are now conducting internal reviews of their policy on drones, and discussions are also likely to start at a pan-European level. But as Europeans begin to articulate their policy on the use of drones, a bigger question looms. Can Europe and the United States come together to agree on when drone strikes are permissible? Until now, that would have seemed impossible. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has based its counterterrorism operations on the claim that it is engaged in a worldwide armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces — an idea that President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush and has been kept as the basis for an expanded drone strike campaign. European countries have generally rejected this claim. However, the changes to American policy that President Obama announced in May could open the way to at least the possibility of a dialogue. Obama suggested that he anticipated a time in the not-too-distant future when the armed conflict against al Qaeda might come to an end. More substantially, he made clear that his administration was in the process of switching its policy so that, outside zones of hostilities, it would only use drone strikes against individuals who posed a continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. That is a more restrictive standard than the claim that any member of al Qaeda or an associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time. European countries might be more willing to accept an approach based on this kind of “self-defense” idea. However, there remain some big stumbling blocks. First, a good deal about Obama’s new standards is still unclear. How does he define a “zone of hostilities,” where the new rules will not apply? And what is his understanding of an “imminent” threat? European countries are likely to interpret these key terms in a much narrower way than the United States. Second, Obama’s new approach only applies as a policy choice. His more expansive legal claims remain in the background so that he is free to return to them if he wishes. But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes, as Obama and his officials have sometimes suggested, then Europe is the obvious place to start. And there are a number of steps the administration could take to make an agreement with European countries more likely. For a start, it should cut back the number of drone strikes and be much more open about the reasons for the attacks it conducts and the process for reviewing them after the fact. It should also elaborate its criteria for determining who poses an imminent threat in a way that keeps attacks within tight limits. And, as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, it should keep in mind the possibility of declaring the war against al Qaeda to be over. All this said, Europe also has some tough decisions to make, and it is unclear whether European countries are ready to take a hard look at their views about drone strikes, addressing any weaknesses or inconsistencies in their own position. If they are, the next few years could offer a breakthrough in developing international standards for the use of this new kind of weapon, before the regular use of drones spreads across the globe.

#### Accountability over standards of imminence are impossible from executive internal measures – no one trusts Obama on drones – only the plans court action solves

Goldsmith 13 (Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism)

For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges. ¶ As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.¶ A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.¶ The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." ¶ Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust.¶ Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. ¶ The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. ¶ A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

#### Unrestrained drone policy results in collapse of NATO

Parker 9/17/12 (Tom, former policy director for Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Human Rights at Amnesty International USA. He is also a former officer in the British Security Service (MI5), “U.S. Tactics Threaten NATO” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/us-tactics-threaten-nato-7461?page=1>)

A growing chasm in operational practice is opening up between the United States and its allies in NATO. This rift is putting the Atlantic alliance at risk. Yet no one in Washington seems to be paying attention. The escalating use of unmanned aerial vehicles to strike terrorist suspects in an increasing number of operational environments from the Arabian Peninsula to Southeast Asia, coupled with the continued use of military commissions and indefinite detention, is driving a wedge between the United States and its allies. Attitudes across the Atlantic are hardening fast. This isn’t knee-jerk, man-on-the-street anti-Americanism. European governments that have tried to turn a blind eye to U.S. counterterrorism practices over the past decade are now forced to pay attention by their own courts, which will restrict cooperation in the future. As recently as last month, the German federal prosecutor’s office opened a probe into the October 2010 killing of a German national identified only as “Buenyamin E.” in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan. There are at least four other similar cases involving German nationals and several reported strikes involving legal residents of the United Kingdom. In March, Polish prosecutors charged the former head of Polish intelligence, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, with “unlawfully depriving prisoners of the their liberty” because of the alleged role he played in helping to establish a CIA secret prison in northeastern Poland in 2002–2003. Last December, British Special Forces ran afoul of the UK courts for informally transferring two Al Qaeda suspects detained in Iraq, Yunus Rahmatullah and Amanatullah Ali, to U.S. forces. The British government has been instructed to recover the men from U.S. custody or face legal sanctions that could result in two senior ministers being sent to prison. Perhaps the most dramatic example illustrating the gap that has opened up between the United States and its European allies concerns the 2009 in absentia conviction of twenty-three U.S. agents in an Italian court for the role they played in the extraordinary rendition of radical Imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr from Milan to Cairo. Britain, Poland, Italy and Germany are among America’s closest military partners. Troops from all four countries are currently serving alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but they are now operating within a very different set of constraints than their U.S. counterparts. The European Court of Human Rights established its jurisdiction over stabilization operations in Iraq, and by implication its writ extends to Afghanistan as well. The British government has lost a series of cases before the court relating to its operations in southern Iraq. This means that concepts such as the right to life, protection from arbitrary punishment, remedy and due process apply in areas under the effective control of European forces. Furthermore, the possibility that intelligence provided by any of America’s European allies could be used to target a terrorism suspect in Somalia or the Philippines for a lethal drone strike now raises serious criminal liability issues for the Europeans. The United States conducts such operations under the legal theory that it is in an international armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its affiliates that can be pursued anywhere on the globe where armed force may be required. But not one other member of NATO shares this legal analysis, which flies in the face of established international legal norms. The United States may have taken issue with the traditional idea that wars are fought between states and not between states and criminal gangs, but its allies have not. The heads of Britain’s foreign and domestic intelligence services have been surprisingly open about the “inhibitions” that this growing divergence has caused the transatlantic special relationship, telling Parliament that it has become an obstacle to intelligence sharing. European attitudes are not going to change—the European Court of Human Rights is now deeply embedded in European life, and individual European governments cannot escape its oversight no matter how well disposed they are to assist the United States. The United States has bet heavily on the efficacy of a new array of counterterrorism powers as the answer to Al Qaeda. In doing so it has evolved a concept of operations that has much more in common with the approach to terrorist threats taken by Israel and Russia than by its European partners. There has been little consideration of the wider strategic cost of these tactics, even as the Obama administration doubles down and extends their use. Meanwhile, some of America’s oldest and closest allies are beginning to place more and more constraints on working with U.S. forces. NATO cannot conduct military operations under two competing legal regimes for long. Something has to give—and it may just be the Atlantic alliance.

#### NATO prevents global nuclear war

Zbigniew Brzezinski 9, former U.S. National Security Adviser, Sept/Oct 2009, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 88.5, EBSCO

NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction -- not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. Whether they are "rising peacefully" (a self-confident China), truculently (an imperially nostalgic Russia) or boastfully (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), they all desire a change in the global pecking order. The future conduct of and relationship among these three still relatively cautious revisionist powers will further intensify the strategic uncertainty. Visible on the horizon but not as powerful are the emerging regional rebels, with some of them defiantly reaching for nuclear weapons. North Korea has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its unpredictability could precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since 1945. Iran, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist anti-Western religious movement is threatening the country's political stability. These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of Washington's arrogant unilateralism in Iraq and its demagogic Islamophobic sloganeering weakened the unity of NATO and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.

#### Courts don’t leak intel methods or classified information—this fear has been repeatedly dispelled by hundreds of successfully tried terrorism cases

Jaffer-director ACLU’s National Security Project-12/9/08 <http://www.salon.com/2008/12/09/guantanamo_3/> Don’t replace the old Guantánamo with a new one

The contention that the federal courts are incapable of protecting classified information — “intelligence sources and methods,” in the jargon of national security experts — is another canard. When classified information is at issue in federal criminal prosecutions, a federal statute — the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) — generally permits the government to substitute classified information at trial with an unclassified summary of that information. It is true that CIPA empowers the court to impose sanctions on the government if the substitution of the unclassified summary for the classified information is found to prejudice the defendant, and in theory such sanctions can include the dismissal of the indictment. In practice, however, sanctions are exceedingly rare, and of the hundreds of terrorism cases that have been prosecuted over the last decade, none has been dismissed for reasons relating to classified information. Proponents of new detention authority, including Waxman and Wittes, invoke the threat of exposing “intelligence sources and methods” as a danger inherent to terrorism prosecutions in U.S. courts, but the record of successful prosecutions provides the most effective rebuttal.

#### No over-deterrence of military operations- government liability is rooted in the FTCA and it avoids the chilling associated with individual liability.

Kent, Constitutional Law prof, 13 (Andrew, Faculty Advisor-Center on National Security at

Fordham Law School, prof @ Fordham University School of Law- constitutional law, foreign relations law, national security law, federal courts and procedure, “ARE DAMAGES DIFFERENT?: BIVENS AND NATIONAL SECURITY,” October 8, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330476>) \*\* Evidence is gender paraphrased

Because of sovereign immunity, federal officials are sued under Bivens in their so-called personal rather than official capacities.43 In theory, persons injured by actions of a federal official could also seek compensation by suing the agent’s employer, the United States Government for damages, but the sovereign immunity of the federal government blocks this route.44 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), originally enacted in 1946 and frequently amended since,45 effects a partial waiver of sovereign immunity by allowing suits directly against the federal government instead of officers (who might be judgment proof) and making the United States liable for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of ~~his~~ employment, in accordance with the law of the state where the act or omission occurred.46 Under the Westfall Act of 1988, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal officials within the scope of their employment, except for suits brought for violations of the Constitution.47 In other words, state law tort claims against individual official defendants are now generally barred. The Supreme Court takes the prospect of individual liability in damages for officials very seriously and has crafted immunity doctrines to soften the blow. The Court’s rulings provide the President of the United States and certain classes of officials defined functionally—prosecutors doing prosecutorial work, legislators legislating, judges doing judicial work and certain persons performing “quasijudicial” functions—with absolute immunity from money damages suits, generally for the reason that such suits would be likely to be frequent, frequently meritless, and uniquely capable of disrupting job performance.48 All other government officials are entitled to only “qualified immunity” from money damages suits. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, officials are liable only when they violate “clearly established” federal rights, that is, when “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what ~~he is~~ [they are] doing violates that right.”49 Because qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability but also “a limited entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”50 the Court’s doctrine encourages speedy resolution of immunity questions by judges. The policy reasons for the Court’s active protection of federal officials through a robust immunity doctrine, including fear of dampening the zeal with which officials perform their jobs because of fear of personal liability, are discussed below in Section V.A.

### Imminence

#### Advantage 2- Imminence:

#### Executive control over the definition of “imminence” makes its scope totally unlimited- makes drone overuse and abuse inevitable.

Greenwald 13 (Glenn, J.D. from NYU, award-winning journalist, February 5th, 2013, "Chilling legal memo from Obama DOJ justifies assassination of US citizens," www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo)

4. Expanding the concept of "imminence" beyond recognition The memo claims that the president's assassination power applies to a senior al-Qaida member who "poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States". That is designed to convince citizens to accept this power by leading them to believe it's similar to common and familiar domestic uses of lethal force on US soil: if, for instance, an armed criminal is in the process of robbing a bank or is about to shoot hostages, then the "imminence" of the threat he poses justifies the use of lethal force against him by the police. But this rhetorical tactic is totally misleading. The memo is authorizing assassinations against citizens in circumstances far beyond this understanding of "imminence". Indeed, the memo expressly states that it is inventing "a broader concept of imminence" than is typically used in domestic law. Specifically, the president's assassination power "does not require that the US have clear evidence that a specific attack . . . will take place in the immediate future". The US routinely assassinates its targets not when they are engaged in or plotting attacks but when they are at home, with family members, riding in a car, at work, at funerals, rescuing other drone victims, etc. Many of the early objections to this new memo have focused on this warped and incredibly broad definition of "imminence". The ACLU's Jameel Jaffer told Isikoff that the memo "redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning". Law Professor Kevin Jon Heller called Jaffer's objection "an understatement", noting that the memo's understanding of "imminence" is "wildly overbroad" under international law. Crucially, Heller points out what I noted above: once you accept the memo's reasoning - that the US is engaged in a global war, that the world is a battlefield, and the president has the power to assassinate any member of al-Qaida or associated forces - then there is no way coherent way to limit this power to places where capture is infeasible or to persons posing an "imminent" threat. The legal framework adopted by the memo means the president can kill anyone he claims is a member of al-Qaida regardless of where they are found or what they are doing. The only reason to add these limitations of "imminence" and "feasibility of capture" is, as Heller said, purely political: to make the theories more politically palatable. But the definitions for these terms are so vague and broad that they provide no real limits on the president's assassination power. As the ACLU's Jaffer says: "This is a chilling document" because "it argues that the government has the right to carry out the extrajudicial killing of an American citizen" and the purported limits "are elastic and vaguely defined, and it's easy to see how they could be manipulated."

#### This broad definition of imminence has increased the frequency of attacks and the scope of who can be targeted, which decreases the program’s effectiveness because it reduces the ratio of high-value decapitations to accidental kills

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

The Bush administration's increased reliance on the program started in 2008; however, it is with the Obama administration that we see the most rapid proliferation of attacks. The final phase of the drone program is characterized by an even greater increase in attack frequency and an expansion of the target list to include targets of opportunity and unidentified militants of dubious rank — and funerals.12 As of May 2011, the CIA under the Obama administration has conducted nearly 200 drone strikes. This suggests that the drone target list now includes targets of opportunity, likely including some selected in consultation with the Pakistani authorities in order to facilitate the increasingly unpopular program. This development, in turn, has now decreased the effectiveness of the program when assessed in terms of the ratio of high-value to accidental kills. As Figure 2 shows, the steady increase in drone attacks conducted in Pakistan between 2004 and 2010 has resulted in a far higher number of deaths overall, but a lower rate of successful killings of high-value militant leaders who command, control and inspire organizations. If we define a high-value target as an organizational leader known to intelligence sources and the international media prior to attack and not someone whose death is justified with a posthumous militant status, we see fewer and fewer such hits — the alleged killing of al-Qaeda commander Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011 notwithstanding.13 Data analysis shows that at the beginning of the drone program (2002-04), five or six people were killed for each defined high-value target. As part of that high-value target's immediate entourage, they were much more likely to be militants than civilians. By 2010, one high-value target was killed per 147 total deaths. The increased lethality of each attack is due to larger payloads, broader target sets such as funeral processions, and probable new targeting guidelines (including targets of opportunity).14 Over time, these more deadly drone attacks have failed to effectively decapitate the leadership of anti-U.S. organizations but have killed hundreds of other people subsequently alleged to be militants; many were civilians.15 The rapidly growing population of survivors and witnesses of these brutal attacks have emotional and social needs and incentives to join the ranks of groups that access and attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across the porous border. Drone attacks themselves deliver a politically satisfying short-term "bang for the buck" for U.S. constituencies ignorant of and indifferent to those affected by drone warfare or the phenomenon of blowback. In the Pakistani and Afghan contexts, they inflame the populations and destabilize the institutions that drive regional development. In addition to taking on an unacceptable and extrajudicial toll in human life, the drone strikes in unintended ways complicate the U.S. strategic mission in Afghanistan, as well as the fragile relationship with Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency project in Afghanistan becomes a victim of the first two forms of blowback.

#### Overuse of drones in Pakistan empowers militants and destabilizes the government

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

#### Pakistan collapse risks war with India and loose nukes

Twining 13 (Daniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, Pakistan and the Nuclear Nightmare, Sept 4, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/04/pakistan\_and\_the\_nuclear\_nightmare)

The Washington Post has revealed the intense concern of the U.S. intelligence community about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In addition to gaps in U.S. information about nuclear weapons storage and safeguards, American analysts are worried about the risk of terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities in Pakistan as well as the risk that individual Pakistani nuclear weapons handlers could go rogue in ways that endanger unified national control over these weapons of mass destruction. These concerns raise a wider question for a U.S. national security establishment whose worst nightmares include the collapse of the Pakistani state -- with all its implications for empowerment of terrorists, a regional explosion of violent extremism, war with India, and loss of control over the country's nuclear weapons. That larger question is: Does Pakistan's nuclear arsenal promote the country's unity or its disaggregation? This is a complicated puzzle, in part because nuclear war in South Asia may be more likely as long as nuclear weapons help hold Pakistan together and embolden its military leaders to pursue foreign adventures under the nuclear umbrella. So if we argue that nuclear weapons help maintain Pakistan's integrity as a state -- by empowering and cohering the Pakistani Army -- they may at the same time undermine regional stability and security by making regional war more likely. As South Asia scholar Christine Fair of Georgetown University has argued, the Pakistani military's sponsorship of "jihad under the nuclear umbrella" has gravely undermined the security of Pakistan's neighborhood -- making possible war with India over Kargil in 1999, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008, and Pakistan's ongoing support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other violent extremists. Moreover, Pakistan's proliferation of nuclear technologies has seeded extra-regional instability by boosting "rogue state" nuclear weapons programs as far afield as North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Syria. Worryingly, rather than pursuing a policy of minimal deterrence along Indian lines, Pakistan's military leaders are banking on the future benefits of nuclear weapons by overseeing the proportionately biggest nuclear buildup of any power, developing tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons, and dispersing the nuclear arsenal to ensure its survivability in the event of attack by either the United States or India. (Note that most Pakistanis identify the United States, not India, as their country's primary adversary, despite an alliance dating to 1954 and nearly $30 billion in American assistance since 2001.) The nuclear arsenal sustains Pakistan's unbalanced internal power structure, underwriting Army dominance over elected politicians and neutering civilian control of national security policy; civilian leaders have no practical authority over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Whether one believes the arsenal's governance implications generate stability or instability within Pakistan depends on whether one believes that Army domination of the country is a stabilizing or destabilizing factor. A similarly split opinion derives from whether one deems the Pakistan Army the country's most competent institution and therefore the best steward of weapons whose fall into the wrong hands could lead to global crisis -- or whether one views the Army's history of reckless risk-taking, from sponsoring terrorist attacks against the United States and India to launching multiple wars against India that it had no hope of winning, as a flashing "DANGER" sign suggesting that nuclear weapons are far more likely to be used "rationally" by the armed forces in pursuit of Pakistan's traditional policies of keeping its neighbors off balance. There is no question that the seizure of power by a radicalized group of generals with a revolutionary anti-Indian, anti-American, and social-transformation agenda within Pakistan becomes a far more dangerous scenario in the context of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the geographical dispersal of the country's nuclear arsenal and the relatively low level of authority a battlefield commander would require to employ tactical nuclear weapons raise the risk of their use outside the chain of command. This also raises the risk that the Pakistani Taliban, even if it cannot seize the commanding heights of state institutions, could seize either by force or through infiltration a nuclear warhead at an individual installation and use it to hold the country -- and the world -- to ransom. American intelligence analysts covering Pakistan will continue to lose sleep for a long time to come.

#### Miscalculation means this could escalate to nuclear winter and extinction

Hundley 12 (TOM HUNDLEY, Senior Editor-Pulitzer Center, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war)

Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

### Political Question Doctrine

#### Invocation of the political question doctrine in national security contexts unravels attempts to apply civilian justice to the military—line drawing fails, only a clear signal solves

Vladeck 12 (Stephen, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University,

Washington College of Law, “THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON,” June 14, http://www.aulawreview.org/pdfs/61/61-5/Vladeck.website.pdf)

But if what in fact has taken place over the last decade is a testament to a longer-term pattern, one that neither the political branches nor the Supreme Court disrupt in the near future, then we must confront a more alarming possibility: that as these “national security”-based exceptions increasingly become the rule in contemporary civil litigation against government officers—whether with regard to new “special factors” under Bivens, new bases for contractor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political question doctrine, or even more expansive reliance upon the qualified immunity defense—the line between the unique national security justifications giving rise to these cases and ordinary civil litigation will increasingly blur. Thus, wherever one comes down on the virtues and vices of this new national security canon, perhaps the most important point to take away is the need to carefully cabin its scope. Otherwise, exceptions articulated in the guise of such unique fact patternss could serve more generally to prevent civil liability for government misconduct and to thereby dilute the effectiveness of judicial review as a deterrent for any and all unlawful government action—not just those actions undertaken in ostensibly in defense of the nation.

#### And, the plan’s repudiation of the PQD will not be limited to targeted killing—judges will be able to apply that rationale in future cases

Tokaji 12 (Daniel, Professor in Law at The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law, with Owen Wolfe†, BAKER, BUSH, AND BALLOT BOARDS: THE FEDERALIZATION OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, <http://law.case.edu/journals/lawreview/documents/62CaseWResLRev4.3.Tokaji.pdf>)

Bush can be understood as the new Baker, in the sense that it opened the federal courts to election administration litigation, just as its predecessor opened the federal courts to districting litigation. So as to avoid any misunderstanding, let us first state two qualifications to this claim. First, we are not talking about citation counts. Baker has been cited many times by the Supreme Court and the lower courts in subsequent years.49 By contrast, the Supreme Court has been exceedingly reluctant to cite Bush v. Gore, and there are not a huge number of lower court cases that have cited the case either.50 Second, we are not talking about the intent of the Supreme Court, which was quite different in these two sets of cases. The Baker Court was quite conscious of the fact that it was opening the door, if not the floodgates, to litigation over legislative districts.51 The Bush Court, by contrast, seemed intent on shutting the door behind it, by limiting the principle upon which it sought to rely. This is most clearly evident in the Court’s statement that: Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. The question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections.52 Some commentators have criticized these sentences for being unprincipled, in the sense of declaring a rule of law good for one day only.53 We disagree. What the Court did instead was to (1) assert an equal protection principle established by cases like Baker and Reynolds, variously characterized as “equal weight” to each vote and “equal dignity” to each voter and as valuing one person’s vote over another by "arbitrary and disparate treatment";54 (2) apply this principle to a new context, namely the recounting of punch card ballots in the State of Florida;55 and (3) conclude that this process contravened this basic equal protection principle, without clearly specifying its precise boundaries.56 In other words, the Court applied an established principle to a new area of law without specifying the precise legal test or how it will apply to future cases.57 The wording may be different, but the mode of analysis is not that unusual. In this respect. Bush bears comparison to what the Court did when it decided Baker and later Reynolds. The Court was certainly aware that it was entering the political thicket in Baker.58 It may have had a general rule of law in mind, but it did not specify its precise boundaries. And while Reynolds (like Bush) relies on a vaguely stated principle of law, variously defined as "one person, one vote"59 and an "equally effective voice in the election of members of [the] state legislature,"60 it too does not define the exact boundaries of this principle. The Court in Reynolds was aware that it was entering a new area without precisely specifying the bounds of the new equal protection rule it articulated. This is evident in Chief Justice Earl Warren's notes on the case. These notes, in the Chiefs handwriting, include thirty- four numbered, single sentence points on seven sheets of paper.61 The first reads: "There can be no formula for determining whether equal protection has been afforded."62 Another note, number twenty, reads: "Cannot set out all possibilities in any given case."63 In other words, the Court that decided Baker and Reynolds—like the Court that decided Bush—rested on a somewhat imprecisely stated principle, allowing for refinement in future cases presenting different facts. This also shows up in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Reynolds majority, which declines to say exactly how close to numerical equality districts much be: For the present, we deem it expedient not to attempt to spell out any precise constitutional tests. . . . Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case basis appears to us to provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed constitutional requirements in the area of state legislative apportionment.64 And later: We do not consider here the difficult question of the proper remedial devices which federal courts should utilize in state legislative apportionment cases. Remedial techniques in this new and developing area of the law will probably often differ with the circumstances of the challenged apportionment and a variety of local conditions.65 The similarity to Bush’s language is striking—and given that Reynolds is one of just four equal protection cases cited in Bush, 66 one wonders whether it was conscious. The Court stated a broad principle, declined to state precisely the test it was applying, and bracketed other cases presenting different circumstances, reserving them for another day. Of course, the Reynolds Court did provide some clarity in the one person, one vote cases that followed. So far, the current Court has failed to provide comparable clarity for election administration cases since Bush. And, in fact, in the most prominent election administration case to have arisen since then, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 67 the Court did not cite Bush at all. Again, we are not arguing that there is an exact parallel between Baker and Bush. Our claim is more modest: that there is an important similarity between the two cases in that both set the stage for an increased federal role in their respective realms, redistricting and election administration. While the Supreme Court has avoided Bush v. Gore like the plague—as others have noted, it has become the Voldemort of Supreme Court cases, “the case that must not be named”68—that does not mean the case has been without an impact. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s clear distrust of state institutions in Bush69 (which is also implicit in Baker) has apparently trickled down to the rest of the federal courts, who are now taking a more active role in state election disputes. As Professor Samuel Issacharoff has put it, Bush v. Gore declared that “federal courts were open for business when it came to adjudicating election administration claims.”70 Lower courts “relaxed rules regarding standing, ripeness, and . . . justiciability”71 in order to hear more election disputes. They allowed these cases to go to the front of the queue, often deciding them on an expedited basis in the weeks preceding an election. In some areas, like voting technology, election litigation led to changes in how elections are run, even in the absence of a binding decision on the merits.72

#### Scenario 1- Civil Military Relations

#### Military justice is at a crisis point due to the decline in civilian influence—continued deference undermines confidence in the military

Hillman, law prof-UC Hastings, 13 (Elizabeth L. Hillman, a professor of law at the University of California, Hastings, is the president of the National Institute of Military Justice, “Get Civilian Authorities Involved,” July 13, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/28/ensuring-justice-in-the-military/get-civilian-authorities-involved-in-military-justice>)

Since the end of the draft in 1973, we’ve become accustomed to a very active military, composed only of volunteers, to which our civilian leaders have reflexively deferred, whether on matters of personnel policy or strategy. Consider the remarkable solicitude that was required before “don’t ask/don’t tell” came to an end. Before this civil rights reform could be implemented, surveys and studies and working groups that dwarfed the resources that have been invested in understanding sexual assault were dedicated to making sure that lesbians and gay men serving openly would not undermine morale. A sense of superiority, and a resentful posture toward civilian authority, have pervaded military culture as our use of the military to pursue national goals has expanded since the end of World War II, and presidential power has grown. The Supreme Court has increasingly deferred to military decision-making. While valuing the sacrifices of service members and honoring our responsibility to veterans, we need to end this isolation of the military from civil society. Doing so would helprestore confidence in military justice. The notion –that soldiers are superior to civilians was not, of course, invented in the late 20th-century, but historians and legal scholars alike have remarked on this recent trend. Robert L. Goldich casts the post-modern army as staffed with legionnaires rather than citizen-soldiers. Andrew J. Bacevich sees the relatively new “warrior-professional” as standing above, not with, his or her civilian counterpart. Diane H. Mazur considers judicial deference to the military a misguided constitutional doctrine that undermines military professionalism itself. To end the sexual assaults that have eroded confidence in military justice, we need to consider whether our service members, and our nation, are well served by leaving all decisions about crime and punishment entirely in the hands of those in uniform. Civilian authorities should help shoulder the burdens of having a professional armed force by participating in the process of investigating and prosecuting service members' misconduct. Shrinking military jurisdiction so that some crimes committed by service members are prosecuted by civilian courts could help disrupt the isolated culture of the military and educate civilians about military life. If an alleged rape, robbery, or drunk driving offense were prosecuted by civil authorities, military resources could be conserved for military operations, training, and discipline rather than spent on criminal investigation, prosecution and punishment. Even a modest shift in the direction of civil authority would signal the military's openness to changeand progress, as well as its essential connection to civil law and government.

#### Judicial review and ending deference is key to CMR- executive and congressional action is not sufficient to check the military

Gilbert, Lieutenant Colonel, 98 (Michael, Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Gilbert, B.S., USAF Academy; MSBA, Boston University; J.D., McGeorge School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. He is a member of the State Bars of Nebraska and California. “ARTICLE: The Military and the Federal Judiciary: an Unexplored Part of the Civil-Military Relations Triangle,” 8 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 197, lexis)

In February 1958, Army Master Sergeant James B. Stanley, who was stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, volunteered to participate in a program to test the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. Unknown to Stanley, he was secretly administered four doses of LSD as part of an Army plan to study the effects of the drug on human subjects. Stanley then allegedly began suffering from hallucinations and periods of memory loss and incoherence, which impaired his ability to perform military service and which led to his discharge from the Army and later a divorce from his wife. He discovered what he had undergone when the Army sent him a letter soliciting his cooperation in a study of the long-term effects of LSD on "'volunteers who participated' in the 1958 tests." After exhausting his administrative remedies, Stanley filed suit against the government in federal district court. 81 Stanley argued that in this case, his superiors might not have been superior military officers, as in Chappell, but rather civilians, and further that his injuries were not incident to military service, as in Feres, because his injuries resulted from secret experimentation. The federal district and appellate courts held that Stanley was not preempted by United States v. Chappell in asserting a claim under Bivens by limiting Chappell to bar actions against superior officers for wrongs that involve direct orders in the performance of military duties. In other words, the lower courts limited the reach of Chappell to only matters involving the performance of military duties and the discipline and order necessary to carry out such orders, which did not include surreptitious testing of dangerous drugs on military members. 82 The Supreme Court summarily disregarded the lower courts' attempt to differentiate the instant case from precedent because Stanley was on active duty and was participating in a "bona fide" Army program, therefore, his injuries were incident to service. With regard to the attempt to differentiate his case from Chappell, the Supreme Court conceded that some of the language in Chappell focusing on the officer-subordinate relationship would not apply to Stanley's case, but nevertheless ruled that the basis for Feres also applied and controlled in Bivens actions. Accordingly, the test was not [\*219] so much that an officer-subordinate relationship was involved, but rather an "incident to service" test. 83 The Court thus transplanted the Feres doctrine to govern and limit Bivens actions by military members. In overturning the lower courts' ruling, the Supreme Court again discussed the special factors that mandate hesitation of judicial interference. They also discussed the explicit constitutional assignment of responsibility to Congress of maintaining the armed forces in ruling that even this most egregious misconduct and complete lack of concern of human rights is not a basis upon which the pl–aintiff can seek damages in a court of law. Based upon this case and previous cases, military members are totally extricated from the general population and are subject to a lower standard that is not even contemplated for the remaining citizenry in matters of constitutional import. The Court expressly declined to adopt a test that would determine whether a case is cognizable based upon military discipline and decision making. Believing that such a test would be an intrusion of judicial inquiry into military matters, thereby causing problems by making military officers liable for explaining in court proceedings the details of their military commands and disrupting "the military regime," the Court adopted a virtual blanket of protection for military commanders. Because Congress had not invited judicial review by passing a statute authorizing such a suit by a military member, the Court was not going to intrude into military affairs left to the discretion of Congress. 84 In essence, the Court has constructed a military exception to the Constitution. Had the Court actually reviewed the facts presented by the cases discussed above, applied the tests that are normally applied to the type of cases presented, and then ruled in favor the military, they possibly still could have been criticized, but at least respected for actually conducting a meaningful judicial review of the presented cases. Completely changing constitutional principles in order to provide great deference with little to no inquiry is an abdication of the Court's responsibility and surrenders the rights of military members to the complete subjugation by Congress and the President. The question now presented is whether such an exception is appropriate in terms of civil-military relations. [\*220] The Efficacy of a Military Exception To The Constitution In Civil-Military Relations Does the lack of judicial protection strengthen or erode democratic civilian control at a time when some commentators express concern over the state of civil-military relations? The current hands-off approach by the judiciary in cases concerning or impacting military affairs presents a paradoxical dilemma for civil-military relations. Did the framers of the Constitution intend to establish civilian control over the military by giving plenary authority to two branches of the government to the exclusion of the third branch? 85 Can the military develop its own professionalism, which is essential to an objective civilian control, if the military is totally removed from society's system of judicial protection? Are the Foxes Going To Take Care Of The Hens When The Farmer Is Not Watching? On one hand, the eschewal of becoming involved in military affairs through judicial review of lawsuits concerning the military more completely subordinates the military to the constitutional authority of Congress and the President and, in essence, creates a "split Constitution." 86 The Congress and President thus can control the military virtually without concern about judicial interference, which will occur only under the most egregious circumstances, and can be assured that the military will not attempt to overturn their decisions and orders through judicial review 87 After all, should not the judiciary trust the Congress, a co-equal branch of government sworn, as is the judiciary, to uphold the Constitution? 88 On the other hand, the Constitution establishes certain basic rights for all Americans, regardless of position within society. In fact, the Constitution and laws that support the Constitution serve as the ultimate protector for the weakest of society who have no other means by which to thwart infringement of their rights. By the U.S. Supreme Court stating that the military is a separate society with specialized and complex concerns, and that the Constitution grants plenary authority over the military to the legislative and executive branches, military members are excluded from the protection of a society that depends upon their service. Moreover, they [\*221] are left to the mercy of a power that can act with impunity, notwithstanding Supreme Court prescription that the Congress and the President fulfill their awesome positions of trust in upholding the Constitution and subordinate laws to the greatest extent possible while acting to protect our national security through military affairs. By excluding military members from the same protections that their civilian counterparts enjoy, military members are subject to a much more severe form of government that does not contain the checks and balances that restrict government infringement upon rights. Would it indeed be so bad if the judiciary reviewed and decided lawsuits brought by military members on their merits? Would such oversight be an unreasonable intrusion wreaking havoc in the minds of military leaders? Have any such problems evolved in the federal government in the civilian sector where employees may file suits against the government in court? Empowering Objective Control By Removing Judicial Oversight The increase of the power exercised by the legislative and executive branches of our federal government by the decrease in the power of review by the judicial branch supports Professor Huntington's model of objective civilian control. 89 Rather than making the military a mirror of the state, such as in subjective control, the removal of judicial oversight provides the military with the autonomy to control their profession. At the same time, the total dependence of the military upon their civilian and military leaders as judge and jury creates an independent military sphere. Nevertheless, Huntington completely ignores the role of the judiciary in civil-military relations. Even when he addresses the separation of powers, which traditionally includes the relationship of the judiciary to the other branches, he only examines the role of the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislative branch. 90 The weakening of the influence of the judiciary over matters concerning the military produces an equivalent concomitant strengthening of the two primary branches of government charged with establishing, maintaining, and running the armed forces. More than merely strengthening the control by Congress and the President over the military, 91 the judiciary, in its current position, protects ~~her [\*222] sister~~ branches of government from outside interference of those who want to change or affect the military, such as those who seek judicial overturn of the DoD homosexual conduct policy, and from inside interference of those who seek to challenge the authority of their superiors. 92 In this vein, the judicial self-restraint in becoming an ombudsman for aggrieved military members who seek either damages, redress, or reversal of orders can be argued to produce a correlating increase in the strictness of good order and discipline of the armed forces. 93 Dissension is reduced to the point of a member either accepting the supremacy of those superior or separating from the military service for which they volunteered. The unquestioning loyalty produced squelches dissension within the military ranks and portrays the military as a single unit of uniformity committed to serving without question the national civilian leadership, thereby preserving the delicate balance between freedom and order. 94 In a speech on the Bill of Rights and the military at the New York University Law School in 1962, then-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, discussed how our country was created in the midst of deep and serious distrust of standing military forces. He then described the debate on how best to preserve civilian control of the military in the Constitution so that the military could never reverse its subordination to civilian authority. Finally, he declared that the military has embraced this concept as part of our rich tradition that "must be regarded as an essential constituent of the fabric of our political life." 95 Former Chief Justice Warren was correct that the military culture in the United States is completely imbued with the idea of civilian control. Recent events strongly evidence this core understanding of military members. When the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Fogelman, resigned from his position and retired because of a disagreement with the civilian Secretary of the Air Force over appropriate action to take in a particular case, he did so because he could do nothing else in protest. There is no doubt that Congress maintains and regulates the armed forces and that the President is Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, civilian control of the military has been confused with the non-interference with Presidential and Congressional control of the military, yet the Supreme Court is no less "civilian" than these other branches. Ironically, because of the [\*223] extensive delegation of authority from Congress and the President to the military hierarchy, the military itself has become all powerful in relation to its members. Unless the judiciary branch becomes involved, there is no civilian oversight of the military in the way it treats its members. This important civilian check on the military has been forfeited by the Court. With these realizations, the judiciary is wrong in avoiding inquiry into cases brought by military members. The military is not a complex, separate and distinct society. If it were, the danger of losing control would be greater. By characterizing it as such and giving the military leadership complete reign over subordinates in all matters, the judiciary ignores their responsibility to provide a check to military commanders and balance the rights of those subject to orders, which if not followed may lead to criminal charges. 96 A professional military, as envisioned by our nation's leaders and written about by Professor Huntington, can operate efficiently in a system that allows judicial review of actions brought by military members. Their professionalism will deter wrongs and will accept responsibility when wrongs are committed. Removing the military from the society that they serve by denying them judicial protection alienates the military and frustrates those who have no protection from wrongs other than the independent judiciary. The proper role of the judiciary in civil-military relations is to ensure that neither the legislative branch, the executive branch, nor the military violate their responsibility to care for and treat fairly the sons and daughters of our nation who volunteer for military service. When federal prisoners can file lawsuits for often frivolous reasons, but military members cannot enter a courtroom after being subjected to secret experimentation with dangerous, illegal drugs, something is wrong. When military members cannot seek redress even for discrimination or injury caused by gross negligence, civil-military relations suffer because the judiciary is not ensuring that the balance of power is not being abused.

CMR erosion collapses hegemony

Barnes, Retired Colonel, 11 (Rudy Barnes, Jr., BA in PoliSci from the Citadel, Military Awards: Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal, “An Isolated Military as a Threat to Military Legitimacy,” http://militarylegitimacyreview.com/?page\_id=159)

The legitimacy of the US military depends upon civil-military relations. In Iraq and Afghanistan conflicting religions and cultures have presented daunting challenges for the US military since mission success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations depends upon public support in those hostile cultural environments; and even in the US, civil-military relations are fragile since the military is an authoritarian regime within a democratic society. This cultural dichotomy within our society creates the continuing potential for conflict between authoritarian military values and more libertarian civilian values that can undermine military legitimacy, especially when there are fewer bridges between the military and the civilian population it serves. The US military is a shield that protects our national security, but it can also be a sword that threatens our national security. After all, the US military controls the world’s most destructive weaponry. Our Founding Fathers understood this danger and provided for a separation of powers to prevent a concentration of power in the military. Still, if the US military were ever to become isolated from the civilian population it serves, then civil-military relations would deteriorate and US security would be at risk. Richard Cohen has opined that we are slowly but inexorably moving toward an isolated military: The military of today is removed from society in general. It is a majority white and, according to a Heritage Foundation study, disproportionately Southern. New England is underrepresented, and so are big cities, but the poor are no longer cannon fodder – if they ever were – and neither are blacks. We all fight and die just about in proportion to our numbers in the population. The all-volunteer military has enabled America to fight two wars while many of its citizens do not know of a single fatality or even of anyone who has fought overseas. This is a military conscripted by culture and class – induced, not coerced, indoctrinated in all the proper cliches about serving one’s country, honored and romanticized by those of us who would not, for a moment, think of doing the same. You get the picture. Talking about the picture, what exactly is wrong with it? A couple of things. First, this distant Army enables us to fight wars about which the general public is largely indifferent. Had there been a draft, the war in Iraq might never have been fought – or would have produced the civil protests of the Vietnam War era. The Iraq debacle was made possible by a professional military and by going into debt. George W. Bush didn’t need your body or, in the short run, your money. Southerners would fight, and foreigners would buy the bonds. For understandable reasons, no great songs have come out of the war in Iraq. The other problem is that the military has become something of a priesthood. It is virtually worshipped for its admirable qualities while its less admirable ones are hardly mentioned or known. It has such standing that it is awfully hard for mere civilians – including the commander in chief – to question it. Dwight Eisenhower could because he had stars on his shoulders, and when he warned of the military-industrial complex, people paid some attention. Harry Truman had fought in one World War and John Kennedy and Gerald Ford in another, but now the political cupboard of combat vets is bare and there are few civilian leaders who have the experience, the standing, to question the military. This is yet another reason to mourn the death of Richard Holbrooke. He learned in Vietnam that stars don’t make for infallibility, sometimes just for arrogance. (Cohen, How Little the US Knows of War, Washington Post, January 4, 2011) The 2010 elections generated the usual volume of political debate, but conspicuously absent were the two wars in which US military forces have been engaged for ten years. It seems that dissatisfaction with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has caused the American public to forget them and those military forces left to fight them. A forgotten military can become an isolated military with the expected erosion of civil-military relations. But the forgotten US military has not gone unnoticed: Tom Brokaw noted that there have been almost 5,000 Americans killed and 30,000 wounded, with over $1 trillion spent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with no end in sight. Yet most Americans have little connection with the all-volunteer military that is fighting these wars. It represents only one percent of Americans and is drawn mostly from the working class and middle class. The result is that military families are often isolated “…in their own war zone.” (See Brokaw, The Wars that America Forgot About, New York Times, October 17, 2010) Bob Herbert echoed Brokaw’s sentiments and advocated reinstating the draft to end the cultural isolation of the military. (Herbert, The Way We Treat Our Troops, New York Times, October 22, 2010) In another commentary on the forgotten military, Michael Gerson cited Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who warned of a widening cultural gap between military and civilian cultures: “There is a risk over time of developing a cadre of military leaders that politically, culturally and geographically have less and less in common with the people they have sworn to defend.” Secretary Gates promoted ROTC programs as a hedge against such a cultural divide. Gerson concluded that the military was a professional class by virtue of its unique skills and experience: “They are not like the rest of America—thank God. They bear a disproportionate burden, and they seem proud to do so. And they don’t need the rest of society to join them, just to support them.” (Gerson, The Wars We Left Behind, Washington Post, October 28, 2010) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has seconded the observations of Secretary Gates and warned of an increasingly isolated military and “…a potentially dangerous gulf between the civilian world and men and women in uniform.” Mullen explained, “To the degree that we are out of touch I believe is a very dangerous force.” And he went on to observe that “Our audience, our underpinnings, our authority, everything we are, everything we do, comes from the American people…and we cannot afford to be out of touch with them.” (Charley Keyes, Joint Chiefs Chair Warns of Disconnect Between Military and Civilians, CNN.com, January 10, 2011) Gerson’s observation that the military are not like the rest of Americans goes to the heart of the matter. An isolated military that exacerbates conflicting military and civilian values could undermine civil-military relations and threaten military legitimacy. The potential for conflicting values is evident in the article by Kevin Govern on Higher Standards of Honorable Conduct Reinforced: Lessons (Re) Learned from the Captain Honors Incident (see article posted under this section) which highlights the “exemplary conduct” standard for military personnel and the need to enforce the unique standards of exemplary conduct to maintain good order and discipline in the military. The communal and authoritarian military values inherent in the standards of exemplary conduct often clash with more libertarian civilian values; but in the past that clash has been moderated by bridges between the military and civilian cultures, most notably provided by the draft, the National Guard and reserve components. The draft is gone and the National Guard and reserve components are losing ground in an all-volunteer military that is withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan. The Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC) has provided most civilian-soldier leaders for the US military in the past, but it is doubtful that will continue in the future. If Coleman McCarthy speaks for our best colleges and universities, then ROTC is in trouble and so are civil-military relations: These days, the academic senates of the Ivies and other schools are no doubt pondering the return of military recruiters to their campuses. Meanwhile, the Pentagon, which oversees ROTC programs on more than 300 campuses, has to be asking if it wants to expand to the elite campuses, where old antipathies are remembered on both sides. It should not be forgotten that schools have legitimate and moral reasons for keeping the military at bay, regardless of the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell.” They can stand with those who for reasons of conscience reject military solutions to conflicts. ROTC and its warrior ethic taint the intellectual purity of a school, if by purity we mean trying to rise above the foul idea that nations can kill and destroy their way to peace. If a school such as Harvard does sell out to the military, let it at least be honest and add a sign at its Cambridge front portal: Harvard, a Pentagon Annex. (Coleman McCarthy, Don’t ask, don’t tell has been repealed. ROTC still shouldn’t be on campus, Washington Post, December 30, 2010) McCarthy’s attitude toward ROTC reflects a dangerous intellectual elitism that threatens civil-military relations and military legitimacy. But there are also conservative voices that recognize the limitations of ROTC and offer alternatives. John Lehman, a former Secretary of the Navy, and Richard Kohn, a professor of military history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, don’t take issue with McCarthy. They suggest that ROTC be abandoned in favor of a combination of military scholarships and officer training during summers and after graduation: Rather than expanding ROTC into elite institutions, it would be better to replace ROTC over time with a more efficient, more effective and less costly program to attract the best of America’s youth to the services and perhaps to military careers. Except from an economic perspective, ROTC isn’t efficient for students. They take courses from faculty almost invariably less prepared and experienced to teach college courses, many of which do not count for credit and cover material more akin to military training than undergraduate education. Weekly drills and other activities dilute the focus on academic education. ROTC was begun before World War I to create an officer corps for a large force of reservists to be mobilized in a national emergency. It has outgrown this purpose and evolved into just another source of officers for a military establishment that has integrated regulars and reservists into a “total force” in which the difference is between part-time and full-time soldiering. The armed services should consider a program modeled in part on the Marine Platoon Leaders Corps to attract the nation’s most promising young people. In a national competition similar to ROTC scholarships, students should be recruited for four years of active duty and four years of reserve service by means of all-expenses-paid scholarships to the college or university of their choice. Many would no doubt take these lucrative grants to the nation’s most distinguished schools, where they would get top-flight educations and could devote full attention on campus to their studies. Youths would gain their military training and education by serving in the reserve or National Guard during college (thus fulfilling their reserve obligation). Being enlisted would teach them basic military skills and give them experience in being led before becoming leaders themselves. As reservists during college, they would be obligated to deploy only once, which would not unduly delay their education or commissioned service. They could receive their officer education at Officer Candidate School summer camps or after graduation from college. This program could also be available to those who do not win scholarships but are qualified and wish to serve. Such a system would cost less while attracting more, and more outstanding, youth to military service, spare uniformed officers for a maxed-out military establishment, and reconnect the nation’s leadership to military service – a concern since the beginning of the all-volunteer armed force. (Lehman and Kohn, Don’t expand ROTC. Replace it. Washington Post, January 28, 2011) The system proposed by Lehman and Kohn would preserve good civil-military relations only if it could attract as many reserve component (civilian-soldier) military officers as has ROTC over the years. Otherwise the demise of ROTC will only hasten the isolation of the US military. As noted by Richard Cohen, Tom Brokaw, Bob Herbert, Michael Gerson, Secretary of Defense Bill Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen, the increasing isolation of the US military is a real danger to civil-military relations and military legitimacy. The trends are ominous: US military forces are drawing down as they withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan and budget cuts are certain to reduce both active and reserve components, with fewer bridges to link a shrinking and forgotten all-volunteer military to the civilian society it serves. The US has been blessed with good civil-military relations over the years, primarily due to the many civilian-soldiers who have served in the military. But with fewer civilian-soldiers to moderate cultural differences between an authoritarian military and a democratic society, the isolation of the US military becomes more likely. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen were right to emphasize the danger of an isolated military, but that has not always been the prevailing view. In his classic 1957 work on civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington advocated the isolation of the professional military to prevent its corruption by civilian politics. It is ironic that in his later years Huntington saw the geopolitical threat environment as a clash of civilizations which required military leaders to work closely with civilians to achieve strategic political objectives in hostile cultural environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. (see discussion in Barnes, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium, Frank Cass, 1996, at pp 111-115) Today, the specter of an isolated military haunts the future of civil-military relations and military legitimacy. With fewer civilian-soldiers from the National Guard and Reserve components to bridge the gap between our military and civilian cultures, an all-volunteer professional military could revive Huntington’s model of an isolated military to preserve its integrity from what it perceives to be a morally corrupt civilian society. It is an idea that has been argued before. (see Robert L. Maginnis, A Chasm of Values, Military Review (February 1993), cited in Barnes, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium, Frank Cass, 1996, at p 55, n 6, and p 113, n 20) The military is a small part of our population—only 1 percent—but the Department of Defense is our largest bureaucracy and notorious for its resistance to change. Thomas Jefferson once observed the need for such institutions to change with the times: “Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstance, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.” Michael Gerson noted that the military remains a unique culture of warriors within a civilian culture, and that “it is not like the rest of America.” For that reason a forgotten and isolated military with values that do not keep pace with changing times and circumstances and conflict with civilian values would not only be a threat to military legitimacy but also be a threat to our individual freedom and democracy. In summary, the US military is in danger of becoming isolated from the civilian society it must serve. Military legitimacy and good civil-military relations depend upon the military maintaining close bonds with civilian society. In contemporary military operations military leaders must be both diplomats as well as warriors. They must be effective working with civilians in domestic and foreign emergencies and in civil-military operations such as counterinsurgency and stability operations, and they must be combat leaders who can destroy enemy forces with overwhelming force. Diplomat-warriors can perform these diverse leadership roles and maintain the close bonds needed between the military and civilian society. Such military leaders can help avoid an isolated military and insure healthy civil-military relations.

Loss of mission effectiveness risks multiple nuclear wars

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7 Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

#### Scenario 2 is Warming –

#### The political question doctrine is killing climate litigation now

Koshofer 10/1/13 (Warren A., partner in the law firm of Michelman & Robinson, LLP and a member of the firm’s commercial and business litigation department, “Defending Climate Change Liability” <http://www.rmmagazine.com/2013/10/01/defending-climate-change-liability/>)

For almost a decade now, plaintiffs have tried to sue various industries for damages resulting from greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. In staving off such claims, defendants have employed two formidable primary defenses rooted in the doctrines of standing and political question. Through use of these and other defenses, defendants have been able to prevail time and again in climate change liability-related litigation. Flowing from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the doctrine of standing limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases that, by necessity, must include: 1) an injury in fact to the plaintiff, 2) that was caused by the defendant, and 3) that is capable of being redressed by the court. If any of the conditions are not present, the plaintiff does not have standing to sue the defendant. The doctrine of standing thus focuses on whether there is a proper plaintiff before the court. The focus of the political question doctrine is different; it addresses whether a plaintiff presents a claim that can be adjudicated by the court without interfering with the business of any other branch or department of the U.S. government. Setting the stage for a defense rooted in the political question doctrine in climate change-related litigation was the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to regulate greenhouse gas emissions through the Clean Air Act. Consequently, courts have since used the political question doctrine to bar plaintiff’s liability claims for damages allegedly resulting from climate change. For example, in 2011, the Supreme Court held in American Electric Power v. Connecticut that corporations cannot be sued for damages allegedly resulting from greenhouse gas emissions because, among other reasons, the Clean Air Act delegates the management of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions to the EPA. Among the more noteworthy of the climate change litigation cases is Comer v. Murphy Oil. Brought by plaintiffs in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Gulf residents sued numerous energy companies alleging that their emissions of greenhouse gases exacerbated the severity of the hurricane. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring the claims, which ranged from public and private nuisance to trespass and negligence to fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy. The plaintiffs tried to re-file the case, but it was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in May. The Supreme Court is currently considering a petition to review the case, but it is widely believed that there is little likelihood of the petition being granted. Part of this belief is rooted in the Supreme Court’s treatment of a another climate change litigation case. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., the Alaskan shore village of Kivalina sued a group of energy companies operating in the region, alleging that their greenhouse gas emissions were causing polar ice to melt, sea levels to rise and the shoreline land of the village to erode at a rapid pace. Similar to the Comer decision in 2012, a district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that any of their alleged injuries could be traced back to the defendants’ actions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, and also addressed the political question doctrine defense, ruling that, based on the Supreme Court precedent set in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, “We need not engage in complex issue and fact-specific analysis in this case, because we have direct Supreme Court guidance that has already determined that Congress has directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources and has therefore displaced federal common law.” By all accounts, then, it seems the defendants in climate change litigation will continue to prevail in court. The bad news for defendants, however, is that climate change-related litigation still exists, and it is expensive to defend. Once named in climate change-related litigation, a defendant often turns to its commercial general liability insurer for defense and indemnification. The trouble is that the allegations made in climate change-related litigation do not always trigger an insurer’s defense and indemnification duties.

#### Climate change litigation is key to solving global warming – 3 warrants

Flynn 13 (James, J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law; Assistant Legislation Editor, Georgia State University Law Review; Visiting Student, Florida State University College of Law, “CLIMATE OF CONFUSION: CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER V. CONNECTICUT”, lexis, accessed 1/5/2014)

2. Turning Up the Heat on Congress: Litigating to Legislate The only solution to anthropogenic global warming is a concerted global effort. 264 Such an effort cannot succeed without the leadership, or at least support, of the United States. 265 Real change in the United States requires comprehensive legislation that covers all facets of global warming: greenhouse gas emissions, land use, efficiency, and sustainable growth. In addition to maximizing time until the EPA either issues regulations or is prevented from doing so by Congress, litigation advances the goal of such comprehensive legislation in three ways. First, litigation keeps the pressure on fossil fuel companies and other large emitters. Comprehensive legislation is a near impossibility as long as the largest contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions are able to exert powerful control over the nation's [\*862] energy policy and the climate change discussion. 266 While the companies have the financial resources to battle in court, it is imperative that advocates and states make them do so. One need only look at the tobacco litigation of the 1960s through the 1990s to understand that success against a major industry is possible. 267 Here, though, the stakes are even higher. The chances of obtaining a largescale settlement from the fossil fuel industry is likely smaller now that the Court has ruled that some federal common law nuisance claims are displaced, because lower courts may hold that nuisance claims for money damages are also displaced. 268 However, advocates of climate change legislation should keep trying to obtain such a settlement through other tort remedies. A substantially damaging settlement may encourage fossil fuel companies to reposition their assets into more sustainable technologies to avoid more settlements, thus minimizing future emissions. Alternatively, if the fossil fuel companies feel threatened enough, they may begin to use their clout to persuade Congress to pass comprehensive legislation to protect their industry from such wide-ranging suits. 269 Second, litigation keeps the issue in the public consciousness during a time when the media is failing at its responsibilities to the public. 270 The media's coverage of climate change has been both inadequate and misleading. 271 Indeed, some polls suggest Americans [\*863] believe less in climate change now than just a few years ago. 272 Litigation, especially high-profile litigation, forces the issue into the public sphere, even though it may receive a negative connotation in the media. The more the public hears about the issue, the greater chance that people will demand their local and state politicians take action. Finally, litigation sends a clear message to Congress that simple appeasements will not suffice. 273 Comprehensive legislation is needed--legislation that mandates consistently declining emissions levels while simultaneously propping up replacement sources of energy. 274 Fill-in measures, like the EPA's authority to regulate emissions from power plants, are not sufficient. Humans need energy, and there can be no doubt that we must strike a balance between energy needs and risks to the environment. Catastrophic climate change, however, is simply a risk that we cannot take; it overwhelms the short-term benefits we receive from the burning of fossil fuels. 275 Advocates and states must demonstrate to Congress [\*864] through continuing litigation that the issue is critical and that plaintiffs like those in Kivalina and Comer are suffering genuine losses that demand redress that current statutes do not currently provide. CONCLUSION American Electric proved less important for the precedent it set than for the questions it left unanswered. While courts wrestled over standing, the political question doctrine, and displacement in climate change nuisance cases in the years preceding American Electric, the Supreme Court relied only on the clear displacement path illuminated by its earlier decision in Massachusetts. While the decision in American Electric narrowed the litigation options that climate change advocates have at their disposal, it subtly sent a message to Congress that greater federal action is needed. In writing such a narrow ruling, Justice Ginsburg also sent a message to states and advocates--whether intentionally or not--that climate change litigation is not dead. Until Congress enacts comprehensive climate change legislation, global warming lawsuits will, and must, continue.

#### And climate litigation solves internationally – produces international norms and cooperation

Long 8 (Andrew Long, Professor of Law @ Florida Coastal School of Law “International Consensus and U.S. Climate Change Litigation,” 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 177)

1. Enhancing U.S. International Leadership In a time of unfavorable global opinion toward the United States, explicit judicial involvement with international norms will move the United States **closer to the international community** by acknowledging the relevance of international environmental norms for our legal system. As in other contexts, explicit **judicial internalization of climate change norms would "build**[ ] **U.S. 'soft power,**' [enhance] its moral authority, and strengthen[ ] U.S. capacity for global leadership"2 °3 on climate change, and other global issues. More specifically, domestic judicial consideration of the global climate regime would reaffirm that although the United States has rejected Kyoto, we take the obligation to respect the global commons seriously by recognizing that obligation as a facet of the domestic legal system. U.S. courts' overall failure to interact with the international climate regime, as in other issue areas, has "serious consequences for their roles in international norm creation."2" As judicial understandings of climate change law converge, the early and consistent contributors to the transnational judicial dialogue will likely play the strongest role in shaping the emerging international normative consensus.2"' As Justice L'Heureux- Dube of the Canadian Supreme Court noted in an article describing the decline of the U.S. Supreme Court's global influence, "[decisions which look only inward ... have less relevance to those outside that jurisdiction." °6 Thus, if U.S. courts hope to participate in shaping the normative position on climate change adopted by judiciaries throughout the world, explicit recognition of the relationship between domestic and international law is vital. With climate change in particular, norm development through domestic application should be an important aspect of global learning. The problem requires a global solution beyond the scope of any prior multilateral environmental agreements. This provides a situation in which U.S. judicial reasoning in applying aspects of climate regime thinking to concrete problems will fall into fertile international policy soil. Accordingly, the recognition of international norms in **domestic climate change litigation may play a strengthening role in the perception of U.S. leadership**, encourage U.S. development and exportation of effective domestic climate strategies, and promote international agreements that will enhance consistency with such approaches. In short, explicit judicial discussion of international climate change norms as harmonious with U.S. law can **enhance U.S. ability to regain** a **global leadership** position on the issue and, thereby, more significantly shape the future of the international climate regime. 2. Promoting the Effectiveness of the International Response Along with promoting U.S. interests and standing in the international community, climate change litigation has a direct role to play in developing the international regime if courts directly engage that regime." 7 Just as the United States as an actor may benefit from acknowledging and applying international norms, the regime in which the actions occur will benefit through application and acceptance. Indeed, a case such as Massachusetts v. EPA that directly engages only domestic law can nonetheless be understood to impact international lawmaking by considering its actors."' More important, however, will be cases in which the domestic judiciary gives life to international agreements through direct engagement-a "role [that] is particularly important as a check on the delegitimization of international legal rules that are not enforced."" 9 Assuming, as we must in the arena of climate change, that international law can only effect significant changes in behavior through penetration of the domestic sphere, domestic litigation that employs international law not only provides an instance in which the international appears effective but, more importantly, molds it into a shape that will enable further use in domestic cases or suggest necessary changes internationally. By engaging the international, domestic cases can also provide articulation for the norms that have emerged. The precise meaning of the UNFCCC obligation that nations take measures must be hammered out on the ground. In the United States, if Congress has not acted, it is appropriate for the courts to begin this process by measuring particular actions against the standard. 3. Encouraging Consistency in Domestic Law and Policy In the absence of national climate change law and policy, explicit discussion of international sources and norms in litigation will provide a well-developed baseline for a uniform judicial approach in the domestic realm. This could occur both within and beyond the United States. Within the United States, bringing international environmental law into the mix of judicial reasoning would provide common grounding that unifies the decisions and begins to construct a more systematic preference for development of an effective legal response to international threats. Specifically, if an international climate change norm is found relevant to interpretation of a domestic statute, reference will be appropriate to that norm when future questions of interpretation of the domestic statute arise.210 Thus, to the extent that climate change cases rely upon consensus concerning the scientific evidence of climate change, future cases should use that consensus as a measuring stick for claims of scientific uncertainty.2n The same can occur with norm development. For example, had the Court in Massachusetts tied its jurisdictional or substantive holding to an identifiable norm, the opinion would have greater clarity and value as a precedent in other contexts within the United States. Outside the United States, this approach would provide value to other, more transnationally oriented domestic courts.212 This would serve a norm entrepreneurship function and likely increase agreement among domestic courts on how to approach climate change issues raised under statutes designed for other purposes. 4. Enabling a Check at the Domestic-International Interface Finally, climate change litigation has something to offer for the growth of administrative law at the interface of domestic and international law. At least two points are noteworthy. First, U.S. courts can serve a unique function of providing legal accountability for U.S. failure to honor its UNFCCC commitments.213 Although this might be achieved implicitly, arguably the approach of Massachusetts, doing so explicitly would provide a check of a different magnitude. An explicit check here would serve the purposes identified above, as well as offering the practical benefit of increasing compliance. The dualist tradition, and perhaps concerns of domestic political backlash, weigh against grounding a decision solely in the UNFCC. However, looking to it as a major point in a narrative defining the development of a partly domestic obligation to take national action for the redress of climate change would serve the same beneficial purpose. This approach has the advantage of building a significant bridge over the dualist divide between domestic and international law without ripping the Court's analysis from traditional, dualist moorings. Pg. 212-216

#### Climate change ends all life – runaway climate hothouse earth.

Farley 2010

John, Professor of physics and astronomy @ UNLV, Monthly Review Vol 62 issue 4 september 2010 <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/09/01/our-last-chance-to-save-humanity>

If the sea level rises 70 meters (250 feet), it would not extinguish all human life. After all, hominids have existed on earth for several million years, and homo sapiens more than a hundred thousand, surviving numerous ice ages, during which ice sheets a mile thick covered areas that came to be Boston and New York City. But the world population during the last ice age, ten thousand years ago, has been estimated at five million. It is now six billion. It is human civilization that is unlikely to survive a flooding catastrophe. According to the penultimate chapter, The Venus Syndrome, it might be even worse. Hansen posits a possible future earth, in which a “runaway greenhouse effect” takes over: anthropogenic global warming from greenhouse gases causes increased water vapor in the atmosphere, which in turn causes further warming. The methane clathrate deposits are destabilized, releasing vast amounts of methane in the atmosphere. The oceans become acidified by dissolution of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This could eliminate all life on Earth. This is speculation, of course. But Venus, the planet most similar to earth, has a very strong greenhouse effect, much stronger than earth’s. In the absence of atmospheric greenhouse gases, the surface temperature of the earth would be -18°C (0°F). The actual observed temperature of the Earth is 15°C (59°F). Thus, the greenhouse effect on the Earth raises the temperature by 33°C (59°F). On Venus, the surface temperature, in the absence of the greenhouse effect, would be -41°C (-42°F), well below the melting point of ice. A very strong greenhouse effect raises the surface temperature to the observed temperature of 464°C (867°F). The greenhouse effect on Venus is a staggering 505°C (909°F), creating a planetary surface hot enough to melt lead (!!), which requires “only” 327°C (621°F).

#### Warming is real and anthropogenic, need to cut emissions adaptation can’t solve. Our science is watertight and theirs is garbage.

Harvey 2013

Fiona, Guardian Environment Reporter, IPCC climate report: human impact is 'unequivocal', September 27 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/27/ipcc-climate-report-un-secretary-general

World leaders must now respond to an "unequivocal" message from climate scientists and act with policies to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the United Nations secretary-general urged on Friday. Introducing a major report from a high level UN panel of climate scientists, Ban Ki-moon said, "The heat is on. We must act." The world's leading climate scientists, who have been meeting in all-night sessions this week in the Swedish capital, said there was no longer room for doubt that climate change was occurring, and the dominant cause has been human actions in pouring greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. In their starkest warning yet, following nearly seven years of new research on the climate, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said it was "unequivocal" and that even if the world begins to moderate greenhouse gas emissions, warming is likely to cross the critical threshold of 2C by the end of this century. That would have serious consequences, including sea level rises, heatwaves and changes to rainfall meaning dry regions get less and already wet areas receive more. In response to the report, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, said in a statement: "This is yet another wakeup call: those who deny the science or choose excuses over action are playing with fire." "Once again, the science grows clearer, the case grows more compelling, and the costs of inaction grow beyond anything that anyone with conscience or commonsense should be willing to even contemplate," he said. He said that livelihoods around the world would be impacted. "With those stakes, the response must be all hands on deck. It's not about one country making a demand of another. It's the science itself, demanding action from all of us. The United States is deeply committed to leading on climate change." In a crucial reinforcement of their message – included starkly in this report for the first time – the IPCC warned that the world cannot afford to keep emitting carbon dioxide as it has been doing in recent years. To avoid dangerous levels of climate change, beyond 2C, the world can only emit a total of between 800 and 880 gigatonnes of carbon. Of this, about 530 gigatonnes had already been emitted by 2011. That has a clear implication for our fossil fuel consumption, meaning that humans cannot burn all of the coal, oil and gas reserves that countries and companies possess. As the former UN commissioner Mary Robinson told the Guardian last week, that will have "huge implications for social and economic development." It will also be difficult for business interests to accept. The central estimate is that warming is likely to exceed 2C, the threshold beyond which scientists think global warming will start to wreak serious changes to the planet. That threshold is likely to be reached even if we begin to cut global greenhouse gas emissions, which so far has not happened, according to the report. Other key points from the report are: • Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are now at levels "unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years." • Since the 1950's it's "extremely likely" that human activities have been the dominant cause of the temperature rise. • Concentrations of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have increased to levels that are unprecedented in at least 800,000 years. The burning of fossil fuels is the main reason behind a 40% increase in C02 concentrations since the industrial revolution. • Global temperatures are likely to rise by 0.3C to 4.8C, by the end of the century depending on how much governments control carbon emissions. • Sea levels are expected to rise a further 26-82cm by the end of the century. • The oceans have acidified as they have absorbed about a third of the carbon dioxide emitted. Thomas Stocker, co-chair of the working group on physical science, said the message that greenhouse gases must be reduced was clear. "We give very relevant guidance on the total amount of carbon that can't be emitted to stay to 1.5 or 2C. We are not on the path that would lead us to respect that warming target [which has been agreed by world governments]." He said: "Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions." Though governments around the world have agreed to curb emissions, and at numerous international meetings have reaffirmed their commitment to holding warming to below 2C by the end of the century, greenhouse gas concentrations are still rising at record rates. Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the IPCC, said it was for governments to take action based on the science produced by the panel, consisting of thousands of pages of detail, drawing on the work of more than 800 scientists and hundreds of scientific papers. The scientists also put paid to claims that global warming has "stopped" because global temperatures in the past 15 years have not continued the strong upward march of the preceding years, which is a key argument put forward by sceptics to cast doubt on climate science. But the IPCC said the longer term trends were clear: "Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decade since 1850 in the northern hemisphere [the earliest date for reliable temperature records for the whole hemisphere]." The past 15 years were not such an unusual case, said Stocker. "People always pick 1998 but [that was] a very special year, because a strong El Niño made it unusually hot, and since then there have been some medium-sized volcanic eruptions that have cooled the climate." But he said that further research was needed on the role of the oceans, which are thought to have absorbed more than 90% of the warming so far. The scientists have faced sustained attacks from so-called sceptics, often funded by "vested interests" according to the UN, who try to pick holes in each item of evidence for climate change. The experts have always known they must make their work watertight against such an onslaught, and every conclusion made by the IPCC must pass scrutiny by all of the world's governments before it can be published. Their warning on Friday was sent out to governments around the globe, who convene and fund the IPCC. It was 1988 when scientists were first convened for this task, and in the five landmark reports since then the research has become ever clearer. Now, scientists say they are certain that "warming in the climate system is unequivocal and since 1950 many changes have been observed throughout the climate system that are unprecedented over decades to millennia." That warning, from such a sober body, hemmed in by the need to submit every statement to extraordinary levels of scrutiny, is the starkest yet. "Heatwaves are very likely to occur more frequently and last longer. As the earth warms, we expect to see currently wet regions receiving more rainfall, and dry regions receiving less, although there will be exceptions," Stocker said. Qin Dahe, also co-chair of the working group, said: "As the ocean warm, and glaciers and ice sheets reduce, global mean sea level will continue to rise, but at a faster rate than we have experienced over the past 40 years." Prof David Mackay, chief scientific adviser to the Department of Energy and Climate Change, said: "The far-reaching consequences of this warming are becoming understood, although some uncertainties remain. The most significant uncertainty, however, is how much carbon humanity will choose to put into the atmosphere in the future. It is the total sum of all our carbon emissions that will determine the impacts. We need to take action now, to maximise our chances of being faced with impacts that we, and our children, can deal with. Waiting a decade or two before taking climate change action will certainly lead to greater harm than acting now."

#### Warming will happen faster than they think, makes adaptation impossible and extinction likely.

Jamail 2013

Dahr, independent journalist, is the author of the just-published Beyond the Green Zone: Dispatches from an Unembedded Journalist in Occupied Iraq, citing tons of super qualified people, “The Great Dying” redux? Shocking parallels between ancient mass extinction and climate change, Salon, December 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/12/17/the\_great\_dying\_redux\_shocking\_parallels\_between\_ancient\_mass\_extinction\_and\_climate\_change\_partner/

Climate-change-related deaths are already estimated at five million annually, and the process seems to be accelerating more rapidly than most climate models have suggested. Even without taking into account the release of frozen methane in the Arctic, some scientists are already painting a truly bleak picture of the human future. Take Canadian Wildlife Service biologist Neil Dawe, who in August told a reporter that he wouldn’t be surprised if the generation after him witnessed the extinction of humanity. All around the estuary near his office on Vancouver Island, he has been witnessing the unraveling of “the web of life,” and “it’s happening very quickly.” “Economic growth is the biggest destroyer of the ecology,” Dawe says. “Those people who think you can have a growing economy and a healthy environment are wrong. If we don’t reduce our numbers, nature will do it for us.” And he isn’t hopeful humans will be able to save themselves. “Everything is worse and we’re still doing the same things. Because ecosystems are so resilient, they don’t exact immediate punishment on the stupid.” The University of Arizona’s Guy McPherson has similar fears. “We will have very few humans on the planet because of lack of habitat,” he says. Of recent studies showing the toll temperature increases will take on that habitat, he adds, “They are only looking at CO2 in the atmosphere.” Here’s the question: Could some version of extinction or near-extinction overcome humanity, thanks to climate change — and possibly incredibly fast? Similar things have happened in the past. Fifty-five million years ago, a five degree Celsius rise in average global temperatures seems to have occurred in just 13 years, according to a study published in the October 2013 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. A report in the August 2013 issue of Science revealed that in the near-term Earth’s climate will change 10 times faster than at any other moment in the last 65 million years. “The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere else on the planet,” climate scientist James Hansen has said. “There are potential irreversible effects of melting the Arctic sea ice. If it begins to allow the Arctic Ocean to warm up, and warm the ocean floor, then we’ll begin to release methane hydrates. And if we let that happen, that is a potential tipping point that we don’t want to happen. If we burn all the fossil fuels then we certainly will cause the methane hydrates, eventually, to come out and cause several degrees more warming, and it’s not clear that civilization could survive that extreme climate change.” Yet, long before humanity has burned all fossil fuel reserves on the planet, massive amounts of methane will be released. While the human body is potentially capable of handling a six to nine degree Celsius rise in the planetary temperature, the crops and habitat we use for food production are not. As McPherson put it, “If we see a 3.5 to 4C baseline increase, I see no way to have habitat. We are at .85C above baseline and we’ve already triggered all these self-reinforcing feedback loops.” He adds: “All the evidence points to a locked-in 3.5 to 5 degree C global temperature rise above the 1850 ‘norm’ by mid-century, possibly much sooner. This guarantees a positive feedback, already underway, leading to 4.5 to 6 or more degrees above ‘norm’ and that is a level lethal to life. This is partly due to the fact that humans have to eat and plants can’t adapt fast enough to make that possible for the seven to nine billion of us — so we’ll die.” If you think McPherson’s comment about lack of adaptability goes over the edge, consider that the rate of evolution trails the rate of climate change by a factor of 10,000, according to a paper in the August 2013 issue of Ecology Letters. Furthermore, David Wasdel, director of the Apollo-Gaia Project and an expert on multiple feedback dynamics, says, “We are experiencing change 200 to 300 times faster than any of the previous major extinction events.” Wasdel cites with particular alarm scientific reports showing that the oceans have already lost 40% of their phytoplankton, the base of the global oceanic food chain, because of climate-change-induced acidification and atmospheric temperature variations. (According to the Center for Ocean Solutions: “The oceans have absorbed almost one-half of human-released CO2 emissions since the Industrial Revolution. Although this has moderated the effect of greenhouse gas emissions, it is chemically altering marine ecosystems 100 times more rapidly than it has changed in at least the last 650,000 years.”) “This is already a mass extinction event,” Wasdel adds. “The question is, how far is it going to go? How serious does it become? If we are not able to stop the rate of increase of temperature itself, and get that back under control, then a high temperature event, perhaps another 5-6 degrees [C], would obliterate at least 60% to 80% of the populations and species of life on Earth.”

# 2AC

### Solvency

#### Ex Post review of drone strikes would effectively constrain executive action

Jaffer, Director-ACLU Center for Democracy, 13 **(**Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU's Center for Democracy, “Judicial Review of Targeted Killings,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 185 (2013), <http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/april13/forum_1002.php>)

**Since 9/11,** **the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command** (JSOC) **have used armed drones** to kill thousands of people **in places far removed from conventional battlefields**. Legislators, legal scholars, and human rights advocates have raised concerns about civilian casualties, the legal basis for the strikes, the process by which the executive selects its targets, and the actual or contemplated deployment of armed drones into additional countries. **Some have proposed that Congress establish a court to approve (or disapprove) strikes before the government carries them out. While judicial engagement with the targeted killing program is long overdue**, **those aiming to bring the program in line with our legal traditions** and moral intuitions **should think carefully before embracing this proposal. Creating a new court to issue death warrants is more likely to normalize the targeted killing program than to restrain it. The argument for some form of judicial review is compelling, not least because such review would clarify the scope of the government’s authority to use** lethal **force**. The targeted killing program is predicated on sweeping constructions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s authority to use military force in national self-defense. The government contends, for example, that the AUMF authorizes it to use lethal force against groups that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks and that did not even exist when those attacks were carried out. It contends that the AUMF gives it authority to use lethal force against individuals located far from conventional battlefields. As the Justice Department’s recently leaked white paper makes clear,**the government also contends that the President has authority to use lethal force against those deemed to present “continuing” rather than truly imminent threats.** These claims are controversial. They have been rejected or questioned by human rights groups, legal scholars, federal judges, and U.N. special rapporteurs. Even enthusiasts of the drone program have become anxious about its legal soundness. (“People in Washington need to wake up and realize the legal foundations are crumbling by the day,” Professor Bobby Chesney, a supporter of the program, recently said.) **Judicial review could clarify** the **limits on** the government’s **legal authority and supply** a degree of **legitimacy** to actions taken within those limits. **It could** also encourage executive officials to observe these limits**.** **Executive officials would be less likely to exceed** or abuse their **authority if they were required to defend** their **conduct to** federal **judges.** **Even** Jeh **Johnson, the Defense Department’s former general counsel and a vocal defender of the targeted killing program, acknowledged** in a recent **speech that** judicial review could add “rigor” to the executive’s decisionmaking process. **In explaining the function of** the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance **Court,**which oversees government surveillance in certain national security investigations, executive officials haveoften said that even the mere prospect of judicial review deters error and abuse.

#### Courts are great at trying terrorism cases

Vladeck et al 08 (Steven, A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS”, A REPORT BY THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S LIBERTY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE & COALITION TO DEFEND CHECKS AND BALANCES, June 23,

http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique\_of\_the\_National\_Security\_Courts.pdf)

Advocates of national security courts that would try terrorism suspects claim that traditional Article III courts are unequipped to handle these cases. This claim has not been substantiated, and is made in the face of a significant — and growing — body of evidence to the contrary. A recent report released by Human Rights First persuasively demonstrates that our existing federal courts are competent to try these cases. The report examines more than 120 international terrorism cases brought in the federal courts over the past fifteen years. It finds that established federal courts were able to try these cases without sacrificing either national security or the defendants’ rights to a fair trial.3 The report documents how federal courts have successfully dealt with classified evidence under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) without creating any security breaches. It further concludes that courts have been able to enforce the government’s Brady obligations to share exculpatory evidence with the accused, deal with Miranda warning issues, and provide means for the government to establish a chain of custody for physical evidence, all without jeopardizing national security.

### PQD

#### CO2 in the atmosphere doesn’t make warming inevitable, we can still keep it below 2 degrees.

Hansen and Kharecha et al 2013

James, adjunct professor in the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Columbia University, and Pushker, Ph.D. Geosciences and Astrobiology, NASA Goddard, Assessing "Dangerous Climate Change": Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature, 12-3-13, http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2013/20131202\_PopularSciencePlosOneE.pdf

We conclude that the widely accepted target of limiting human-made global climate warming to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above the preindustrial level is too high and would subject young people, future generations and nature to irreparable harm. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel use must be reduced rapidly to avoid irreversible consequences such as sea level rise large enough to inundate most coastal cities and extermination of many of today's species. Unabated global warming would also worsen climate extremes. In association with summer high pressure systems, warming causes stronger summer heat waves, more intense droughts, and wildfires that burn hotter. Yet because warming causes the atmosphere to hold more water vapor, which is the fuel that drives thunderstorms, tornadoes and tropical storms, it also leads to the possibility of stronger storms as well as heavier rainfall and floods. Observational data reveal that some climate extremes are already increasing in response to warming of several tenths of a degree in recent decades; these extremes would likely be much enhanced with warming of 2°C or more. We use evidence from Earth's climate history and measurements of Earth's present energy imbalance as our principal tools for inferring climate sensitivity and the safe level of global warming. The inferred warming limit leads to a limit on cumulative fossil fuel emissions. It is assessed that humanity must aim to keep global temperature close to the range occurring in the past 10,000 years, the Holocene epoch, a time of relatively stable climate and stable sea level during which civilization developed. The world cooled slowly over the last half of the Holocene, but warming of 0.8°C (1.4°F) in the past 100 years has brought global temperature back near the Holocene maximum. We note that policies should emphasize fossil fuel carbon, not mixing in carbon from forest changes as if it were equivalent. Most of the carbon from fossil fuel burning will stay in the climate system for of order 100,000 years. Of course carbon dioxide from deforestation also causes warming and policies must address that carbon source, but good land use policies could restore most of that carbon to the biosphere on a time scale of decades to centuries. However, maximum biospheric restoration is likely to be only comparable to the past deforestation source, so fossil fuel sources must be strictly limited. We conclude that human-made warming could be held to about 1°C (1.8°F) if cumulative industrial-era fossil fuel emissions are limited to 500 GtC (gigatons of carbon, where a gigaton is one billion metric tons) and if policies are pursued to restore 100 GtC into the biosphere, including the soil. This scenario leads to reduction of atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm by 2100, as needed to restore Earth's energy balance and approximately stabilize climate. In contrast, we conclude that the target to limit global warming to 2°C, confirmed by the 2009 Copenhagen Accord of the 15th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, would lead to disastrous consequences. For example, Earth's history shows that 2°C global warming is likely to result in eventual sea level rise of the order of six meters (20 feet). Moreover, we note that such a warming level would induce "slow amplifying feedbacks". These amplifying feedbacks include a reduction of ice sheet area, vegetation changes including growth of forests in high latitudes of Asia and North America that are now sparsely vegetated, and an increase of atmospheric gases such as nitrous oxide and methane. These slow feedbacks are small if climate stays within the Holocene range, but substantial if warming reaches 2°C or more.

### Imminence

#### Plan increases the accuracy of strikes which strengthens our program – solves blowback by increasing the ratio of high-value kills to civilian casualties

Adelsberg 12 (Samuel S., \* J.D. Candidate 2013, Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens” Harvard Law & Policy Review 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)

 [\*445] Rather, as recognized by the Founders in the Fourth Amendment, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional role for judges to play. Two scholars of national security law recently highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in targeting decisions: "Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place." n47 Judges are both knowledgeable in the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations. These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional restraint when targeting citizens. Reforming the decision-making process for executing American citizens to allow for judicial oversight would restore the separation of powers framework envisioned by the Founders and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on steadier constitutional ground. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, "the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch." n48 Now, we will turn to what this judicial involvement would look like.

### 2AC Restriction

#### We meet-Due process rights are judicial restrictions on executive authority

Al-Aulaqi Motion to Dismiss Memo 2013 (PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, files February 5, 2013)

Despite Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the habeas cases, Defs. Br. 12, claims alleging unlawful deprivation of life under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are as textually committed to the courts as claims brought under the Suspension Clause. Both are fundamental judicial checks on executive authority. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting distinction between the Suspension Clause and Bill of Rights amendments because both are “restrictions on governmental power”), rev’d on other grounds by Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.

#### C/I – Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 **Power refers to an agent's** ability or **capacity to produce a change** in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), **and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent** by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; **the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do**.

#### C/I --- Restriction is limitation, NOT prohibition

CAC 12,COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, DIVISION ONE, 207 Cal. App. 4th 601; 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716; 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 772

We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in [\*615] section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application]); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning [\*\*\*23] of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree.¶CA(9)(9) The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.” Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the usual and ordinary meanings to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana [\*\*727] statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that HN21Go to this Headnote in the case.the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature [\*\*\*24] decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

#### Their interpretation is flawed

#### A. Over limits- core cases revolve around regulating behavior not banning policies. Their interp eliminates topic lit.

#### B. Affirmative Ground-Ban policies are dead against agent counterplans. Err aff because the range of good affs is small and the neg is strapped with generics.

#### ---Reasonability-competing interpretations causes substance crowd. Good is good enough when the topic is already limited and our aff is squarely in the lit

#### No effects voter – the affirmative garners all solvency from the topical, fiated parts of the plan – the PQD advantages are about the grounds of the case which are a necessary part of any judicial restriction

#### Not a voter – reject the portions of the affirmative that are effectual, not the team

### 2AC CIC

#### ---Spec arguments are infinitely regressive and not a voter – there are always more things the affirmative can specify and cross-ex checks the impact

#### --Test case solves – there’s only one case that tries ex post review of drone strikes on PQD grounds and that’s in the district court – proves we’re predictable

#### ---We meet judicial review is a restriction directly on authority – that was Au-Aulaqi motion to dismiss

#### ---C/I-War powers authority refers to the President’s overall power over national defense and warmaking

Manget 91 Fred F, Assistant General Counsel with the CIA, "Presidential War Powers", 1991, media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf

The President's war powers authority is actually a national defense power that exists at all times, whether or not there is a war declared by Congress, an armed conflict, or any other hostilities or fighting. In a recent case the Supreme Court upheld the revocation of the passport of a former CIA employee (Agee) and rejected his contention that certain statements of Executive Branch policy were entitled to diminished weight because they concerned the powers of the Executive in wartime. The Court stated: "History eloquently attests that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are by no means limited to times of formally declared war. " 3 ; Another court has said that the war power is not confined to actual engagements on fields of battle only but embraces every aspect of national defense and comprehends everything required to wage war successfully. 3 H A third court stated: "It is-and must be-true that the Executive should be accorded wide and normally unassailable discretion with respect to the conduct of the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means . "39 ¶ Thus, the Executive Branch's constitutional war powers authority does not spring into existence when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on there being hostilities. It empowers the President to prepare for war as well as wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times.

#### ---Their interpretation either means we are the only topical targeted killing affirmative or there are no targeted killing affs-you should Err aff---excluding an area would destroy aff ground which is already constrained by agent counterplans.

Heidt-Guy who debated with Fitzmier and brother of the guy whose team reads targeted killing-13

"A Memorandum on the Topic Area.pdf"

~http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4846.0~~

Voting for restrict presidential war power establishes a very narrow topic – commander in chief blows the lid off that restriction. Those of us with gray in our hair may recall the restricting commander in chief power means anything from Congressional control over the president’s medical staff (Kansas) to Congressional control over media pools in wartime (a Bill Newnam Special) and everything in between. Modern versions of the parameters of that type of topic are elaborated in the topic paper when, for example, the authors isolate drones as a core controversy invoking the “president’s legal authority to conduct the war on terror.” This is nonsense for two reasons. First, the AUMF granted the president all the legal authority necessary and, second, the CONDUCT of the war is power reserved for the commander in chief and does not fall under the purview of Congressional war declaration power. There are no constitutional questions related to drone use aside from use on American citizens (without due process). This gross error in the topic paper reflects one of the downsides of using sources like the Idaho Statesman to comment on constitutional issues. The topic paper is correct, however, that Affs could restrict presidential actions to target U.S. citizens, but even that might not be topical if the topic is written as restrict/reduce presidential war power since this goes to a “use” issue and not a “power” issue (and, at best, reflects a violation of the Constitutional order and not an expansion of the Constitutional order – one could argue that ending violations is not a restriction in presidential war power since the president never had the power to act in the first place).

#### ---This is at best an extra topicality argument-the plan can only apply to targeted killing that draws authority from war powers-extra topicality isn’t a voting issue-at worst this just clarifies the meaning of the plan.

### 2AC Executive CP

#### -Can’t solve PQD – court action is necessary to break the doctrine – other actors can’t do it

#### -Can’t solve imminence – redefining imminence is critical to checking the executive – only an external branch solves – that’s Greenwald

#### -Means it can’t solve allies – redefinition is critical to match our interpretation with the EU’s which is key to NATO cohesion

#### -Links to the DA -

#### OLC Fails

#### a. OLC rubber stamps---external oversight key—(their text does NOT remedy this)

Ilya **Somin 11**, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law, June 21 2011, “Obama, the OLC, and the Libya Intervention,” http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/21/obama-the-olc-and-the-libya-intervention/

**But I am** more **skeptical** than Balkin **that illegal presidential action can be constrained through better consultation with legal experts within the executive branch. The fact is that the president can almost always find respectable lawyers within his administration who will tell him that any policy he really wants to undertake is constitutional.** **Despite the opposition of the OLC, Obama got the view he wanted from the White House Counsel and** from **State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh. Bush**, of course, **got it from within the OLC itself, in the form of John Yoo’s “torture memo.” This isn’t just because administration lawyers want to tell their political masters what they want to hear. It also arises from the understandable fact that administrations tend to appoint people who share the president’s ideological agenda and approach to constitutional interpretation**. By all accounts, John Yoo was and is a true believer in nearly unlimited wartime executive power. He wasn’t simply trying to please Bush or Dick Cheney.¶ Better and more thorough **consultation with executive branch lawyers can prevent** the president from undertaking **actions that virtually all legal experts believe to be unconstitutional. But on the many disputed questions where there is no such consensus, the president will usually be able find administration lawyers who will tell him what he wants to hear**. To his credit, Ackerman is aware of this possibility, and recommends a creative institutional fix in his recent book: a new quasi-independent tribunal for assessing constitutional issues within the executive branch. I am somewhat skeptical that his approach will work, and it may well require a constitutional amendment to enact. I may elaborate these points in a future post, if time permits.¶ Regardless, **for the foreseeable future, the main constraints on unconstitutional presidential activity must come from outside executive branch** – that is, **from Congress, the courts,** and public opinion. **These constraints are highly imperfect. But they do impose genuine costs on presidents who cross the line**. Ackerman cites the Watergate scandal, Iran-Contra and the “torture memo” as examples of the sorts of abuses of executive power that need to be restricted. True enough. But it’s worth remembering that Nixon was forced to resign over Watergate, Reagan paid a high political price for Iran-Contra, and the torture memo was a public relations disaster for Bush, whose administration eventually ended up withdrawing it (thanks in large part to the efforts of Jack Goldsmith). On the other side of the ledger, Bill Clinton paid little price for waging an illegal war in Kosovo, though he avoided it in part by keeping that conflict short and limited. It remains to be seen whether President Obama will suffer any political damage over Libya.

**b. OLC not binding, gets circumvented---empirically true**

Bruce **Ackerman 11**, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University, “LOST INSIDE THE BELTWAY: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MORRISON,” Harvard Law Review Forum Vol 124:13, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124forum\_ackerman.pdf

The problem is confirmed by Morrison’s very useful data analysis, which shows that **only thirteen percent of OLC opinions have provided a more- or- less clear “no” to the White House** during the past generation.34 **Morrison’s data- set doesn’t include OLC’s unpublished opinions — which typically involve confidential matters involving national security. Since OLC is almost- certainly more deferential to the White House in these sensitive areas, the percentage of “no’s” would likely sink into the single- digits if these secret opinions could be included in Morrison’s data set.**35 And remember, **quantitative data can’t take into account the occasions on which the White House is especially exigent in its telephonic demands**.36 ¶ **\*\*\*TO FOOTNOTES\*\*\***¶ 36 Morrison is undoubtedly right in suggesting that stare decisis plays a restraining role in garden-variety cases. But he also notes that **the OLC overrules** (or substantially modifies**) its own decisions in more than five percent of the opinions in his sample**. See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOP n.NPN. **This is a significant percentage, given my focus on the likely way the OLC will function in high-stress situations. It indicates that stare decisis is by no means a rigid rule, and** that **the OLC cannot credibly claim that its hands are tied when the White House is pressuring it to overrule existing case- law to vindicate a high-priority presidential initiative**. ¶ Similarly, Morrison is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that his data fails to reflect the fact that the OLC sometimes informally deflects the White House from a legally problematic initiative. See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNV. But **on high-priority initiatives, the White House won’t easily take** an informal **“no” for an answer — it will either push the OLC to write a formal opinion saying “yes” or** it will **withdraw the issue from its jurisdiction and rely on the WHC to uphold the legality of the President’s plan**. As a consequence, I believe that Morrison’s data provides an overestimate, not an under-estimate, of likely OLC resistance: it fails to count unreported national security opinions (on which the OLC is probably extremely deferential), and this failure is not mitigated by its additional failure to detect informal modes of OLC resistance.

### 2AC Ukraine

#### No link – we’re the DC Court

Jaffer, Director-ACLU Center for Democracy, 13 (Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU's Center for Democracy, “Judicial Review of Targeted Killings,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 185 (2013), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/april13/forum\_1002.php)

This is why the establishment of a specialized court would more likely institutionalize the existing program, with its elision of the imminence requirement, than narrow it. Second, judicial engagement with the targeted killing program does not actually require the establishment of a new court. In a case pending before Judge Rosemary Collyer of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights represent the estates of the three U.S. citizens whom the CIA and JSOC killed in Yemen in 2011.

#### Link non-unique – massive Gitmo case in the court now

Pilkington 3/11 (Ed, “Guantánamo hunger-strikers endure 'water cure' torture, federal court hears”, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/11/guantnamo-hunger-strike-water-cure-torture)

Hunger-striking Guantánamo detainees are being subjected to a form of torture known as the “water cure” that was widely used in the Spanish Inquisition, lawyers are claiming, in the first legal challenge to force-feeding at the military base brought before a US federal court. The case was lodged on Tuesday in the US district court for the DC circuit that has jurisdiction over Guantánamo. It was brought on behalf of Emad Abdullah Hassan, a Yemeni who has been on hunger strike in the detention camp intermittently since 2005 and continuously since 2007. By his lawyers’ reckoning, Hassan has been force-fed more than 5,000 times during that period, in conditions they allege are abusive, illegal under international law, and a form of torture. The motion calls for a preliminary injunction that would put an immediate halt on the practice pending full review. The legal move is the first of its kind to be brought before the civilian courts following last month’s decision by a federal appeals court to allow such a challenge to go ahead. It paves the way for the first comprehensive hearing in the US judicial system over the legality and propriety of the military’s controversial use of force-feeding at Guantánamo. Hassan, now 34, was picked up by Pakistani security forces in February 2002, having travelled from his native Yemen to Faisalbad to attend university. He has been held without charge for almost 12 years in Guantánamo, despite the fact that he was cleared for release in 2009. The legal motion, together with testimony from Clive Stafford Smith, founder of the human rights organisation Reprieve, which is co-sponsoring the challenge, gives gruesome details of Hassan’s treatment at the hands of US military guards and military doctors administering the feeding regime. Since November 2005, techniques have been used that the lawyers allege are designed to inflict pain and humiliation on the prisoner in the hope of persuading him to give up his hunger strike. Those techniques include: • using feeding tubes that are too big to be inserted into the prisoner’s nostrils without causing great pain; • insisting on inserting and removing the tube for each feed, rather than leaving it in for prolonged periods, causing repeated agony twice a day; • restraining Hassan in what he and other detainees call the “torture chair” in which his hands, legs, waist, shoulders and head are strapped down tightly; • giving the prisoners a laxative drug at the same time as feeding, causing them to defecate while in the restraint chair and then leaving them in their own filth. The technique also includes what Hassan’s lawyers liken to the medieval torture of the “water cure”, where large volumes of liquids are forced into detainees’ stomachs at excessive speed, causing severe enteral pain. As much as 2,300ml of fluid may be passed down the tube in just 20 to 30 minutes – a method that an expert witness in the case, retired military doctor Stephen Xenakis, said “does not conform to standards of medical care”. The legal challenge stresses that Hassan’s intention on going on hunger strike is not to commit suicide, and that he does not want to die. Rather, he is inspired by Mahatma Gandhi, among others, to conduct “a peaceful protest against indefinite detention without charge or trial”, the motion says. Hassan’s lawyers argue that an acceptable alternative to Guantánamo’s current force-feeding regime can be found in the US federal bureau of prisons regulations. They stipulate that detainees should only be force-fed if a physician determines that they are facing an imminent risk of death or great bodily injury. Even then, “only that amount of force necessary to gain control of the inmate” should be applied, the regulations state.

#### Aid doesn’t solve Ukraine

**Boone, London School of Economics, 3-12-14**

(Peter, “The I.M.F., Ukraine and President Obama”, <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/the-i-m-f-ukraine-and-president-obama/>, ldg)

Unfortunately, this elevated level of support, and the way in which it will be provided, is not what Ukraine needs. What it does need is political and economic reforms; too much aid will just get in the way of sensible change. To be clear, Ukraine’s immediate financial problems are serious. Official data show the Ukrainian government has about $10 billion of debt repayments due in 2014 and an additional $1.6 billion is due to creditors from the state enterprise Naftogaz. Ukraine rarely pays Russia on time for imported natural gas, and arrears have now built up to near $2 billion. Add in the likely budget deficit for the rest of this year, plus $3.7 billion in payments by the National Bank of Ukraine to the I.M.F., and what is known in the jargon as “total financing needs” in 2014 could be near $20 billion. The requirements for 2015 are just as large. This math motivates the Ukrainian authorities’ demand for roughly $35 billion in assistance over two years. International reserves are already at rock-bottom levels of $15 billion, so if the new government can’t find financing – either from foreign governments or from private markets – it will not be able to make the obligated debt payments. A scenario with disorderly default would, in that case, be entirely plausible. And the financial vulnerabilities actually run deeper. Individuals and companies have around $18 billion in foreign currency deposits in the local banking system. At the end of February, as the crisis intensified, the authorities imposed a partial freeze on these deposits, hoping to stem a massive loss of foreign currency. The government is now hoping to lift these restrictions, but there is no guarantee people won’t run for the exits again, either now or when troubles renew. The problem with providing large amounts of foreign lending upfront is that Ukraine has a very bad track record, regardless of who is in power. Some people in the new government have been in power before and do not have such a good reputation with regard to living up to their promises and curtailing corruption. The public discussion of the relevant numbers can be misleading. The United States has promised $1 billion in loan guarantees, but this is not enough to make a difference. The European Union made a headline-grabbing announcement of offering around $11 billion, but a lot of this is money that would be disbursed slowly (in fact, out to 2020, according to the official fact sheet). The Japanese have also promised to help, and the European Union is organizing a donor conference to raise more. In our assessment, however, the total amount of ready money directly from the United States and the European Union will not exceed $3 billion to $4 billion for 2014 – and most of this will depend on Ukraine reaching a mutually acceptable agreement with the I.M.F. All eyes therefore turn to the I.M.F., which previously offered a multi-year loan of $15 billion to Ukraine. The catch is that much of that loan was not actually disbursed because the Ukrainian government did not pursue the policies to which it had committed, such as bringing its budget deficit under control – and the I.M.F. ceased providing funding at the end of 2011. In December 2013, the I.M.F.’s executive board assessed what went well and what went badly with that Ukrainian program (I.M.F. terminology for a loan with policy conditions). Its main conclusion was that steps were taken in the right direction only when funds were withheld until the Ukrainians implemented the agreed-upon policies (known as “prior actions” in I.M.F.-speak). The board blamed failure on “insufficient ownership”; in other words, the I.M.F. wanted some reforms – such as raising energy prices, as these are a big cost to the budget that also feed corruption – but the government didn’t see the point. One reason the Ukrainian authorities have regularly balked at I.M.F. conditions over the last 20 years is that they always have an alternative: Russia. This latest crisis arose in part because both Russia and the European Union were pressing Ukraine to sign trade pacts that would ostensibly have tied Ukraine to one side or the other. Most ominously for Russia, there were strong indications that Ukraine would eventually join NATO. Russia would obviously not be pleased to see NATO troops on its borders with Ukraine. Imagine the American reaction if Panama or Mexico suddenly announced it was allowing in Russian (or Chinese) troops. This fight over Ukraine between Russia and the West has been going on since the 1990s. Each time the Ukrainian government changes, one side rushes to the fore, offering funds and support. The great problem for Ukraine, and those civil society-oriented individuals that fought for the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, is that too much foreign support is forthcoming, making it too tempting for governments to switch allegiances, and extort funds from each side. Any I.M.F. program will undoubtedly fail again unless this chronic struggle between Russia and the West over Ukraine is stopped. The European Union and Russia need to reach diplomatic accords that end their dangerous and destructive fights over Ukraine. For example, the European Union and NATO could agree Ukraine will not join NATO, and provide some confidence they will not change their minds. (For example, Finland has a close relationship with NATO but is not a candidate for membership; Finland is a prosperous member of the European Union and also of the euro zone, yet it guards its independence and maintains good ties with Russia.) Russia could, in turn, agree to not prevent Ukraine from signing the association agreement with Europe that was highly popular among Ukrainians. Unfortunately, American and European politicians appear more determined to throw money at the problem than to reflect on their own role in abetting Ukraine’s failures. There are already strong pressures on the I.M.F. to provide generous upfront financing with few “prior actions.” The I.M.F. does not usually rush in with new lending just weeks ahead of major elections, and it should be concerned about the apparent lack of representation for eastern Ukraine in the temporary government that emerged from the Maidan protests. The I.M.F.’s own analysis implies that large amounts of foreign funds, public or private, are not any kind of solution in this situation. But for political reasons the I.M.F. is likely to ignore the sensible conclusions drawn from its own experience. A great deal of I.M.F. support would allow Ukraine to make its debt payments on time – good news for the Western investors in Ukrainian debt, which may avoid restructurings and write-downs. Generous financing will also mean Ukrainian politicians can avoid the tough steps needed to cut the budget deficit and to reduce the corruption associated with low energy prices. Essentially, another large aid package delays reforms for yet another day. There is no point to bailing out Ukraine’s creditors and backstopping Ukrainian banks when the core problems persist: pervasive corruption, exacerbated by the ability to play Russia and the West against each other. The approach being adopted will simply leave Ukraine with more debt – and, when this I.M.F. program also fails, create further opportunity for Russia to turn the tables once more.

#### Court action shields Obama from controversy

Pacelle, Prof-Political Science-Georgia Southern, 2002 (Richard L., Prof of Poli Sci @ Georgia Southern University, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Politics: The Least Dangerous Branch? 2002 p 175-6)

The limitations on the Court are not as significant as they once seemed. They constrain the Court, but the boundaries of those constraints are very broad. Justiciability is self-imposed and seems to be a function of the composition of the Court, rather than a philosophical position. Checks and balances are seldom successfully invoked against the judiciary, in part because the Court has positive institutional resources to justify its decisions. The Supreme Court has a relatively high level of diffuse support that comes, in part, from a general lack of knowledge by the public and that contributes to its legitimacy.[6] The cloak of the Constitution and the symbolism attendant to the marble palace and the law contribute as well. As a result, presidents and Congress should pause before striking at the Court or refusing to follow its directives. Indeed, presidents and members of Congress can often use unpopular Court decisions as political cover. They cite the need to enforce or support such decisions even though they disagree with them. In the end, the institutional limitations do not mandate judicial restraint, but turn the focus to judicial capacity, the subject of the next chapter

#### IMF reform not key to Ukraine aid

**De Rugy, GMU Mercatus Center senior research fellow, 3-11-14**

(Veronique, “The White House Is Using the Ukraine Crisis to Rush Through a Massive Increase in the U.S. Contribution to the IMF”, <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/373113/white-house-using-ukraine-crisis-rush-through-massive-increase-us-contribution-imf>, ldg)

Moreover, the data suggest there’s no reason to require higher quota contributions in order to increase IMF support for Ukraine to the increase in quota contributions. In fact, according to the IMF, its forward-commitment-capacity figure (how much they can lend, basically) is “over $400 billion” at the current exchange rate. AEI’s Desmond Lachman explains: For there is little link between how much money the IMF can lend to Ukraine and the proposed increase in the IMF’s quota resources. With currently more than US$400 billion of uncommitted loanable resources at its disposal, the IMF can single handedly very comfortably meet Ukraine’s borrowing needs for the next two years. After all, the Ukrainian government itself estimates its total borrowing needs for 2014 and 2015 at only around US$35 billion. This would imply that at most the IMF would be called upon to finance Ukraine by between US$15 billion and US$20 billion. Such amounts would represent no more than 5% of the IMF’s currently available resources. In other words, the White House seems to be trying to use the Ukrainian crisis to push through changes to our IMF policies that Congress refused to adopt in the last spending bill.

### 2AC Saudi DA

#### No impact – Saudi-US relations collapsing

Kouttab, ECFR, 11/18/13 (Alexander, European Council on Foreign Relations, “Regional instability and souring US-Saudi relations”, http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary\_regional\_instability\_and\_souring\_us\_saudi\_relations224)

Events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continue to take an unpredictable turn. In particular, the continued souring of relations between the US and Saudi Arabia – long key allies in the region – has the potential to radically reshape local geopolitical dynamics. The renewal of military ties between Russia and Egypt (inconceivable without Saudi support and financing), and talk of closer co-operation between Saudi Arabia and Israel over Iran, are both a case in point. The main point of contention between Riyadh and Washington is the apparent easing of US-Iranian tensions. Isolating Iran and rolling back its influence in the region – in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and elsewhere – remain paramount for Riyadh, whose policy choices are driven by a combination of classic regional balance of power politics overlaid with Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions. Saudi Arabia has also made no secret of its disappointment over US policy in Syria and Egypt (and for different reasons in Palestine), interpreting both as further evidence of Washington’s unreliability as an ally especially in times of need. Even if no rapprochement materialises between the US and Iran, it remains doubtful whether US-Saudi relations will return to normal. While it is true that disagreements between the US and Saudi Arabia are nothing new, what makes things different this time around is not only the inclusion of Iran, a clear “red line” for Saudi Arabia, but also the vastly changed regional context in which their disagreements are being played out. Greater regional instability adds a measure of unpredictability previously unseen and only heightens the possibility that actions will lead to unintended consequences. Until now, no single organising principle or strategic framework exists that can explain the many changes currently transforming the region. Not one regional actor or outside power appears strong enough to dictate the pace or direction of change, while pronouncements of a new era dominated by Sunni-Shia tensions gloss over a number of other dynamics pushing and pulling the region in different directions. These include more traditional state-to-state rivalries and balance of power politics, the re-emergence of powerful civil society actors organised around novel forms of civic mobilisation and engagement, the rise of political Islam as a force to be reckoned with (or suppressed), and the continued proliferation of rival non-state actors. What the Arab uprisings have affirmed, however, is the declining influence of outside powers in the region, coupled with the growing importance of local actors in shaping regional dynamics. The last decade in particular has seen Turkey and Saudi Arabia emerge alongside Iran as regional heavyweights capable of mobilising substantial state resources to project power and influence across the MENA (with Egypt poised to join their ranks depending on domestic developments). This includes providing financial and military aid to allies in the region. What they also unleashed were more complex and fragile balance of power arrangements as different actors jostle for power. Particularly in a region that has largely bucked the trend towards greater integration and security co-operation, coalition building around shared strategic interests takes on added importance. As the fault lines of Saudi-Iranian rivalry continue to restructure the region, however, these coalitions are becoming more defined in scope. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are powerful enough, and their enmity strong enough, to drag the region into a prolonged period of polarisation and brinkmanship. Replete with rising sectarian tensions, this is a worse case scenario for MENA. While the mutual importance of their relationship makes the possibility of a decisive break between Washington and Riyadh highly unlikely, the policy decisions that Saudi Arabia makes have the potential to impact the entire region. Not waiting to see how negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme pan out, it has already sent a volley of warning shots across America’s bow.

#### Drones aren’t key to the relationship and it’s resilient anyway. Empirically their predictions are wrong.

Fisher 2013

Max, MA in Security Studies from Johns Hopkins, Beyond secret drones: The roots of the awkward, improbable, contradictory U.S.-Saudi relationship, February 6 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/06/beyond-secret-drones-the-roots-of-the-awkward-improbable-contradictory-u-s-saudi-relationship/

Sometime around early 2011, as pro-democracy movements challenged the Arab dictatorships of old, often with public support from the United States, the Obama administration opened a secret drone base in one of the oldest. That September, an American drone took off from the base in Saudi Arabia and headed south to Yemen, where it struck and killed an American-born al-Qaeda official named Anwar al-Awlaki. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States have been locked in an awkward but strangely intractable embrace for decades, brought together by oil, terrorism and opposition to Iran. The secret drone base, publicly revealed for the first time Tuesday evening, is probably not on its own a major lynchpin of that relationship. But it is a symbol of how the partnership has endured, despite geo-political and ideological forces that would seem likely to pull the two countries apart, and two years of predictions that they inevitably would. The American-Saudi relationship began with oil and deepened with the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, where Washington and Riyadh found common cause in backing the anti-Soviet mujaheddin. That same year, Saudi Arabia began its campaign against Islamist extremists, some of whom had seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca that November in a disastrous act of terrorism. The United States would join this fight only much later, but the two countries, for all the difference in their tactics (Saudi Arabia has at times sought to appease or co-opt the extremists outright), have worked together closely against groups such as al-Qaeda, and at times against Osama bin Laden personally. The relationship was thrown into a crisis, one from which it has recovered only fitfully, when Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990, and the United States deployed troops to Saudi Arabia to protect against Saddam Hussein's armies. "For many Saudis," Steve Coll wrote in his Pulitzer-winning book, "Ghost Wars," "the Iraqi invasion and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of troops to defend the Kingdom shattered the myth of Saudi independence and ignited open debate about Saudi identity." The internal Saudi debate turned largely on the presence of American troops. "It is not the world against Iraq. It is the West against Islam," a Saudi sheikh declared on one of several cassette tape sermons, millions of copies of which circulated the region. "America has occupied Saudi Arabia." One particularly popular tape, according to Coll, was titled "America as I Saw It" and declared the United States "a nation of beasts who fornicate and eat rotten food." A number of Saudi Islamists and preachers published a petition demanding, among other things, quasi-democratic reform. The movement against America was turning anti-monarchy. Though Saudi royal leaders remained as reliably pro-American as ever, within Saudi society, the Islamists and anti-Westerners had won the public debate. The contradiction has remained within Saudi Arabia ever since. But that contradiction, for all the danger it poses to the Saudi monarchy, seems to have only deepened their reliance on the United States.

#### Increasing restrictions on the drone program is key

Johnsen 11 Gregory Johnsen, Near East Studies Scholar, Princeton University Resetting U.S. Policy Toward Yemen Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 8

In this murky mixture of competing interests, U.S. policy is adrift. Aware of the danger AQAP poses to the United States, the Obama administration has dramatically increased air and drone strikes in Yemen. At best, this is a delaying tactic designed to keep AQAP off-balance until the Yemeni military can act. Airpower alone is not enough to defeat AQAP. Indeed, AQAP may actually grow stronger as a result of strikes. Even more worrisome, this is al-Qaeda's second incarnation in the country. The gains of 2002 and 2003 have been forfeited by years of neglect when U.S. policy bounced from one crisis to the next without an overarching structure. What is needed now for Yemen is a strategic reset that has three goals: initiating a decisive political transition at the top, attacking the roots of AQAP's support in Yemen, and mobilizing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to energize Yemen's failing economy.

# 1AR

## T

### 1AR-Consitutional Rights = Restrictons

#### ---Judical restrictions on war powers include constitutional rights protections

Steele 76 (Sr. Dist. Judge Steel, Kovach v. Middendorf 424 F.Supp. 72, 76 -77 (D.C.Del. 1976)), from a 1976 case from a federal trial court in Delaware)

Defendants argue that in both its two year and four year aspects this case presents a political and not a judicial question within the constitutional power of the Court to decide. Defendants point out that Congress alone has the power under the Constitution “(T)o provide and maintain a Navy”, Art. I, s 8, Cl. 13 and “(T)o make \*77 Rules for the Government and Regulation of the . . . naval Forces”. Art. I, s 8, Cl. 14. Defendants argue that the Constitution has placed the power exclusively in Congress to legislate and in the President to execute in all areas relating to the conduct of the Navy, and that decisional responsibilities in those areas are beyond the constitutional limits of judicial power. Defendants rely primarily upon Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) to support this view. Neither of these cases nor the others referred to by plaintiffdiscuss the issue whether courts, under the power constitutionally conferred upon them, may impose restrictions upon legislative or executive decisions made in the exercise of their war powers if those decisions infringe upon constitutionally protected rights. That courts have the power to do so is settled. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-165, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). See United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622, 51 S.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931)

### 1AR WM Authority

#### Authority includes ability to act without judicial review

John C. Eastman 6, Prof of Law at Chapman University, PhD in Government from the Claremont Graduate University, served as the Director of Congressional & Public Affairs at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, “Be Very Wary of Restricting President's Power,” Feb 21 2006, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.467/pub\_detail.asp]

Prof. Epstein challenges the president's claim of inherent power by noting that the word "power" does not appear in the Commander in Chief clause, but the word "command," fairly implied in the noun "Commander," is a more-than-adequate substitute for "power." Was it really necessary for the drafters of the Constitution to say that the president shall have the power to command? Moreover, Prof. Epstein ignores completely the first clause of Article II -- the Vesting clause, which provides quite clearly that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." The relevant inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution understood these powers to include interception of enemy communications in time of war without the permission of a judge, and on this there is really no doubt; they clearly did, which means that Congress cannot restrict the president's authority by mere statute.¶ Prof. Epstein's own description of the Commander in Chief clause recognizes this. One of the "critical functions" performed by the clause, he notes, is that "Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else." Yet FISA does precisely that, assigning to the FISA court a core command authority, namely, the ability to authorize interception of enemy communications. This authority has been exercised by every wartime president since George Washington.

## Warming

#### Our impacts are severely understated, this is super bad.

Monbiot 2013

George, Climate change? Try catastrophic climate breakdown, The Guardian, September 27 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2013/sep/27/ipcc-climate-change-report-global-warming

Already, a thousand blogs and columns insist the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's new report is a rabid concoction of scare stories whose purpose is to destroy the global economy. But it is, in reality, highly conservative. Reaching agreement among hundreds of authors and reviewers ensures that only the statements which are hardest to dispute are allowed to pass. Even when the scientists have agreed, the report must be tempered in another forge, as politicians question anything they find disagreeable: the new report received 1,855 comments from 32 governments, and the arguments raged through the night before launch. In other words, it's perhaps the biggest and most rigorous process of peer review conducted in any scientific field, at any point in human history. There are no radical departures in this report from the previous assessment, published in 2007; just more evidence demonstrating the extent of global temperature rises, the melting of ice sheets and sea ice, the retreat of the glaciers, the rising and acidification of the oceans and the changes in weather patterns. The message is familiar and shattering: "It's as bad as we thought it was." What the report describes, in its dry, meticulous language, is the collapse of the benign climate in which humans evolved and have prospered, and the loss of the conditions upon which many other lifeforms depend. Climate change and global warming are inadequate terms for what it reveals. The story it tells is of climate breakdown. This is a catastrophe we are capable of foreseeing but incapable of imagining. It's a catastrophe we are singularly ill-equipped to prevent. The IPCC's reports attract denial in all its forms: from a quiet turning away – the response of most people – to shrill disavowal. Despite – or perhaps because of – their rigours, the IPCC's reports attract a magnificent collection of conspiracy theories: the panel is trying to tax us back to the stone age or establish a Nazi/communist dictatorship in which we are herded into camps and forced to crochet our own bicycles. (And they call the scientists scaremongers …) In the Mail, the Telegraph and the dusty basements of the internet, Friday's report (or a draft leaked a few weeks ago) has been trawled for any uncertainties that could be used to discredit. The panel reports that on every continent except Antarctica, man-made warming is likely to have made a substantial contribution to the surface temperature. So those who feel threatened by the evidence ignore the other continents and concentrate on Antarctica, as proof that climate change caused by fossil fuels can't be happening. They make great play of the IPCC's acknowledgement that there has been a "reduction in surface warming trend over the period 1998–2012", but somehow ignore the fact that the past decade is still the warmest in the instrumental record. They manage to overlook the panel's conclusion that this slowing of the trend is likely to have been caused by volcanic eruptions, fluctuations in solar radiation and natural variability in the planetary cycle. Were it not for man-made global warming, these factors could have made the world significantly cooler over this period. That there has been a slight increase in temperature shows the power of the human contribution.

## OLC

#### links

Harvard Law Review 12 (“Developments in the Law – Presidential Authority”, [http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125\_devo.pdf)](http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125_devo.pdf%29//Ava)

There are two important reasons why the White House may undermine OLC independence despite th e benefits discussed earlier: the President is not always looking fo r the “best” view of the law, and the President may not need (or may no t be able) to use OLC to bolster his credibility with Congress, the courts, or the public. To begin with, executive branch legal interpretation differs from interpretation in the traditional judicial context: OLC seeks not simply to extrapolate neutrally from judicial precedent, but also to accommodate the President’s policy preferences insofar as it is able. 114 From the President’s perspective, concern about the boundaries of the law may be subsidiary to pressing policy concerns, especially efforts to prevent further acts of terrorism against the United States. If the President suspects that the “best” interpretation of the law would prevent him from protecting American citizens, he has particularly strong incentives to either compel OLC to go against its better judgment, such as in the case of the torture memos, or simply to avoid asking OLC for a formal opinion, as in the continuation of operations in Libya. One might argue that the President should at least be concerned about the possibility of a court’s declaring his actions to be unconstitutional, but the President also has two powerful reasons to discount this possibility. First, the President may calculate that he has more to gain from a short-term policy victory, even one that is eventually overturned, than he does from rigorously adhering to OLC’s procedures. This incentive may be especially strong during an election year (when a prominent but temporary victory may boost the President’s standing with the electorate) or when a threat materializes and the President acts quickly to counter it; in each case, it may not matter whether his decision is ultimately upheld in court. Second, the President may plausibly calculate that the vast majority of his decisions will never result in actionable litigation, either because he will have left office by the time they come to light 115 or because the courts are likely to hold that the issues are nonjusticiable. 116 Another reason for the White House’s willingness to undermine OLC’s independence is that OLC opinions may no longer be needed (or may no longer be able) to provide their traditional legitimizing function. Particularly in the area of national security, the executive branch is capable of acting unilaterally in many or even most instances, reducing the need to get Congress or the courts to accept the White House’s arguments. 117 Executive appointments have arguably become more politicized in recent times, and the difficulty of getting nominees through the Senate has led Presidents to do their best to ensure that their nominees are firm in their loyalty to the President and his agen- da. 118 And if litigation looms on the horizon, the control exerted by the Solicitor General may compel even independent agencies to adopt a position consistent with the White House’s preferences. 119 Given the President’s increased control over the executive branch and his ability to act in secret, the marginal benefit of increased legitimacy may be outweighed by the risk of OLC’s rejecting his preferred option. Even worse for OLC, its traditionally low profile outside of the government 120 may mean that many citizens first heard of it during the torture memo scandal, when it was subjected to severe criticism. 121 To the extent that the public is aware of OLC’s existence, it is likely due to ongoing calls for OLC’s reform or abolition, as well as the controversy over drone strikes, neither of which is likely to inspire trust. Because the President does not need OLC’s help when dealing with the coordinate branches of government, and because OLC is likely incapable of helping with public opinion at present, the President has even less reason to respect OLC’s independence.

## POLITICS!

### russia

#### CONCEDED 2AC CARD – IMF CAN DO IT ALONE DERUCKE

#### No U.S.-Russia war – conflicting interests aren’t sufficient and economic integration checks

Weitz, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow, 2011

(Richard, World Politics Review Senior Editor, September 27, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>, d/a 2-8-13, ads)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

### Ava thing

#### IMF ISN’T KEY TO UKRAINE AID

Zengerle 3/13 (Patricia, Reuters, “U.S. bill on Ukraine delayed as Congress debates IMF, campaign finance”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-congress-idUSBREA2C20J20140313)

 (Reuters) - The U.S. Senate will not vote until later this month at the earliest on a bill providing aid to Ukraine, after the measure got caught up in a partisan battle over International Monetary Fund reforms. The legislation including the IMF reforms, loan guarantees for Ukraine, sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians and economic aid for the new Kiev government was passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday. But it failed to advance in the Senate on Thursday, after Republicans objected to the inclusion of the IMF measure. The Senate's failure to consider the bill on Thursday meant it will be up for a vote only after Congress returns on March 24 from a recess that begins on Friday. Senate approval is expected, but the measure cannot become law without passing the Republican-led House of Representatives, where it faces a difficult fight. Lawmakers who back the bill blasted opponents in angry speeches on Thursday evening. Republican Arizona Senator John McCain said he was "embarrassed" by members of his own party. He said passing the legislation would have sent an important message of support to Ukraine as Russian forces massed on its border. "You can call yourself Republicans. That's fine, because that's your voter registration," McCain said, hours before leaving Washington with a congressional delegation to Ukraine. "Don't call yourself Reagan Republicans. Ronald Reagan would never, would never let this kind of aggression go unresponded to by the American people," McCain said. Republican House Speaker John Boehner had urged the Senate to pass a House version of the bill, which backs $1 billion in loan guarantees but does not include the other provisions of the Senate measure, particularly the IMF funding. "The IMF money has nothing to do with Ukraine," Boehner said at his weekly news conference earlier on Thursday. The Obama administration has strongly pushed the IMF reforms, but some Republicans complain that they would cost too much and reduce American influence at the international organization.

#### Recent cases have opened the door for a landmark Gitmo case – marks the first comprehensive review in a civil court

Ashtari 3/11 (Shadee, “Guantanamo Bay Prisoner Files Historic Lawsuit Against Obama Over Force-Feeding”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/guantanamo-bay-force-feed-lawsuit\_n\_4942839.html)

Emad Abdullah Hassan, a Yemeni inmate at Guantanamo Bay, introduced a historic lawsuit on Tuesday against the U.S. military prison's force-feeding of detainees on hunger strikes. The case marks the first legal challenge requiring a federal judge to oversee an inmate's testimony on Guantanamo prison conditions. Hassan, who has reportedly engaged in a continuous hunger strike since 2007, was turned over to the U.S. by Pakistani security forces for suspected affiliation with armed groups, but was cleared for release in 2009. Reprieve, a London-based human rights organization representing Hassan, contends that its client has been "abusively force-fed" more than 5,000 times in the past seven years in an effort to end his hunger strike. As a result, "he suffers from serious internal injuries," according to a Reprieve press release Tuesday. "All I want is what President [Barack] Obama promised -- my liberty, and fair treatment for others," Hassan, who has been held without trial since the age of 22, said in a statement. "This is not a life worth living, it is a life of constant pain and suffering. While I do not want to die, it is surely my right to protest peacefully without being degraded and abused every day.” A U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decision in February that allowed federal judges jurisdiction over cases reviewing Guantanamo prison conditions opened the door for Hassan’s lawsuit on Tuesday. Reprieve's founder and director, Clive Stafford Smith, is representing 34-year-old Hassan in his lawsuit against Obama as the chief defendant. In an Al Jazeera op-ed Tuesday, Stafford Smith described his client’s grievances: They started using the restraint chair to strap Emad down while using pressure points on his neck to prevent him from struggling. The prisoners call it the torture chair, and an advertising flier recommends its use for “interrogating prisoners”… When liquid is forced into him at excessive speed, he vomits on himself. The feeding process starts again, but the vomit remains. With the nutrient mix comes the forcible administration of medication to counteract his inevitable constipation. The most humiliating aspect of the whole process, he says, is when he defecates on himself and is forced to remain seated for an hour or more before being returned to his cell -- where he will be refused clean clothes. While a Defense Department representative would not address a lawsuit involving the president, Lt. Col. Todd Breasseale attacked the lawsuit’s credibility, blaming biased inmates for misinformation. “Both the detainee and Reprieve have a specific agenda,” Breasseale told Al Jazeera. “That agenda may not comport with the truth or reality.” In September, the controversial prison camp ended its policy on releasing daily numbers on hunger strike inmates and those being force-fed. One month later, Justice Department lawyer Daniel Lenerz portrayed force-feeding, or "enteral feeding," as a justified response to the disruptive effects of hunger strikes on camp operations. While the Pentagon calls force-feeding a "medical response to [Guantanamo] detainees who hunger strike," according to a March 2013 Joint Task Force Guantanamo memo, the American Medical Association and the World Medical Association oppose the practice as a violation of medical ethics. “In my clinical experience, the rapid infusion of liquids and enteral feedings induces pain and considerable discomfort,” Stephen Xenakis, a retired 28-year Army medical corps officer, said in legal documents obtained by Al Jazeera. A preliminary injunction to prevent further force-feeding by military staff will be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Monday.

### No Obama Backlash

#### A. distancing himself from the program now

McDuffee 1/16 (Allen, “Congress Blocks Plan to Transfer Drone Control From CIA to Pentagon”, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2014/01/drone-strikes-likely-stay-cia/)

An effort by President Obama to transfer America’s lethal, highly classified drone program from the CIA to the Pentagon appears to have been thwarted by lawmakers wielding a secret weapon of their own. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that members of Congress inserted a provision in a classified annex to the $1.1 trillion government spending bill introduced this week that would restrict funding or authorization to transfer from one to the other. The move is an unusual one for Congress, and the debate over it will be closed to a small circle because of the classified nature of the addendum. President Obama, under considerable pressure from the left over the program’s civilian deaths and potential violations of international law, has for some time sought a way to distance himself from the controversial program that has come to be seen as his signature foreign policy and national security tool. However, many members of Congress, even some in the president’s own party, are not in agreement with the transfer of authority. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a member of the Appropriations Committee, declined to offer comment in the Post report, but said last year that she had seen the CIA “exercise patience and discretion specifically to prevent collateral damage” and that she “would really have to be convinced that the military would carry it out that well.” In Beltway circles, experts say that while the U.S. drone program will have minor adjustments as needed, major debate over the direction of the program concluded years ago. “Realistically, the policy window for reforming how the U.S. conducts lethal counterterrorism strikes is closed in Washington,” says Council on Foreign Relations fellow Micah Zenko. However, during his nomination hearings last February, CIA Director John Brennan said that lethal operations are a “last resort” and could distract from the agency’s core mission of intelligence gathering. Over the course of the spring, following Brennan’s hearings, President Obama began laying the groundwork for the shift. In a May 2013 speech on counterterrorism at National Defense University, Obama opaquely signaled that he would minimize the number of lethal strikes and that he was transferring the program from the CIA to the Pentagon — a move that some observers understood as an attempt to make the program more transparent. Just weeks before Obama’s speech, when the Obama administration declined to send a representative to a Senate hearing on drone operations, Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said “more transparency is needed to maintain the support of the American people and the international community.” He added that the White House should provide details on its claim to “its legal authority to engage in targeted killings and the internal checks and balances involved in U.S. drone strikes.”

#### B. he wants restrictions

Baker 2013

(Peter, , New York Times, “Pivoting From a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones”, 5-23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, ldg)

WASHINGTON — Nearly a dozen years after the hijackings that transformed America, President Obama said Thursday that it was time to narrow the scope of the grinding battle against terrorists and begin the transition to a day when the country will no longer be on a war footing. Declaring that “America is at a crossroads,” the president called for redefining what has been a global war into a more targeted assault on terrorist groups threatening the United States. As part of a realignment of counterterrorism policy, he said he would curtail the use of drones, recommit to closing the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and seek new limits on his own war power. In a much-anticipated speech at the National Defense University, Mr. Obama sought to turn the page on the era that began on Sept. 11, 2001, when the imperative of preventing terrorist attacks became both the priority and the preoccupation. Instead, the president suggested that the United States had returned to the state of affairs that existed before Al Qaeda toppled the World Trade Center, when terrorism was a persistent but not existential danger. With Al Qaeda’s core now “on the path to defeat,” he argued, the nation must adapt. “Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue,” Mr. Obama said. “But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. It’s what our democracy demands.” The president’s speech reignited a debate over how to respond to the threat of terrorism that has polarized the capital for years. Republicans contended that Mr. Obama was declaring victory prematurely and underestimating an enduring danger, while liberals complained that he had not gone far enough in ending what they see as the excesses of the Bush era. The precise ramifications of his shift were less clear than the lines of argument, however, because the new policy guidance he signed remains classified, and other changes he embraced require Congressional approval. Mr. Obama, for instance, did not directly mention in his speech that his new order would shift responsibility for drones more toward the military and away from the Central Intelligence Agency. But the combination of his words and deeds foreshadowed the course he hopes to take in the remaining three and a half years of his presidency so that he leaves his successor a profoundly different national security landscape than the one he inherited in 2009. While President George W. Bush saw the fight against terrorism as the defining mission of his presidency, Mr. Obama has always viewed it as one priority among many at a time of wrenching economic and domestic challenges. “Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless ‘global war on terror,’ ” he said, using Mr. Bush’s term, “but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” “Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror,” he added. “We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do — what we must do — is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” Some Republicans expressed alarm about Mr. Obama’s shift, saying it was a mistake to go back to the days when terrorism was seen as a manageable law enforcement problem rather than a dire threat. “The president’s speech today will be viewed by terrorists as a victory,” said Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Rather than continuing successful counterterrorism activities, we are changing course with no clear operational benefit.” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said he still agreed with Mr. Obama about closing the Guantánamo prison, but he called the president’s assertion that Al Qaeda was on the run “a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible.” Mr. McCain said the president had been too passive in the Arab world, particularly in Syria’s civil war. “American leadership is absent in the Middle East,” he said. The liberal discontent with Mr. Obama was on display even before his speech ended. Medea Benjamin, a co-founder of the antiwar group Code Pink, who was in the audience, shouted at the president to release prisoners from Guantánamo, halt C.I.A. drone strikes and apologize to Muslims for killing so many of them. “Abide by the rule of law!” she yelled as security personnel removed her from the auditorium. “You’re a constitutional lawyer!” Col. Morris D. Davis, a former chief prosecutor at Guantánamo who has become a leading critic of the prison, waited until after the speech to express disappointment that Mr. Obama was not more proactive. “It’s great rhetoric,” he said. “But now is the reality going to live up to the rhetoric?” Still, some counterterrorism experts saw it as the natural evolution of the conflict after more than a decade. “This is both a promise to an end to the war on terror, while being a further declaration of war, constrained and proportional in its scope,” said Juan Carlos Zarate, a counterterrorism adviser to Mr. Bush. The new classified policy guidance imposes tougher standards for when drone strikes can be authorized, limiting them to targets who pose “a continuing, imminent threat to Americans” and cannot feasibly be captured, according to government officials. The guidance also begins a process of phasing the C.I.A. out of the drone war and shifting operations to the Pentagon. The guidance expresses the principle that the military should be in the lead and responsible for taking direct action even outside traditional war zones like Afghanistan, officials said. But Pakistan, where the C.I.A. has waged a robust campaign of air assaults on terrorism suspects in the tribal areas, will be grandfathered in for a transition period and remain under C.I.A. control. That exception will be reviewed every six months as the government decides whether Al Qaeda has been neutralized enough in Pakistan and whether troops in Afghanistan can be protected. Officials said they anticipated that the eventual transfer of the C.I.A. drone program in Pakistan to the military would probably coincide with the withdrawal of combat units from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Even as he envisions scaling back the targeted killing, Mr. Obama embraced ideas to limit his own authority. He expressed openness to the idea of a secret court to oversee drone strikes, much like the intelligence court that authorizes secret wiretaps, or instead perhaps some sort of independent body within the executive branch. He did not outline a specific proposal, leaving it to Congress to consider something along those lines. He also called on Congress to “refine and ultimately repeal” the authorization of force it passed in the aftermath of Sept. 11. Aides said he wanted it limited more clearly to combating Al Qaeda and affiliated groups so it could not be used to justify action against other terrorist or extremist organizations. In renewing his vow to close the Guantánamo prison, Mr. Obama highlighted one of his most prominent unkept promises from the 2008 presidential campaign. He came into office vowing to shutter the prison, which has become a symbol around the world of American excesses, within a year, but Congress moved to block him, and then he largely dropped the effort. With 166 detainees still at the prison, Mr. Obama said he would reduce the population even without action by Congress. About half of the detainees have been cleared for return to their home countries, mostly Yemen. Mr. Obama said he was lifting a moratorium he imposed on sending detainees to Yemen, where a new president has inspired more faith in the White House that he would not allow recidivism. The policy changes have been in the works for months as Mr. Obama has sought to reorient his national security strategy. The speech was his most comprehensive public discussion of counterterrorism since he took office, and at times he was almost ruminative, articulating both sides of the argument and weighing trade-offs out loud in a way presidents rarely do. He said that the United States remained in danger from terrorists, as the attacks in Boston and Benghazi, Libya, have demonstrated, but that the nature of the threat “has shifted and evolved.” He noted that terrorists, including some radicalized at home, had carried out attacks, but less ambitious than the ones on Sept. 11. “We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them,” he said. “But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.”